Wednesday, 29 August 2007
Friday, 17 August 2007
WHEN TERRORISTS GO NUCLEAR
Threat, Securitization and Responses
Aaron Grajo Laylo
In November 2001, as U.S. warplanes flew over Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden told a nerve-racking statement to Pakistani journalist Hamid Mira, “Al Qaeda had access to nuclear weapons and would not hesitate to use them for "self-defense."
Days are already dangerous and getting even more dangerous as dissenters make use of the latest and highly-developed machineries, tools and equipment in technology to frighten people and pressure governments to the extent of spurring discord within the latter. Eventually, referent objects, being the constant target of terrorist attacks and after being choked by threats, may get destabilized in the absence of pertinent security measures.
For years, strategic placement of cities and borders along coasts or natural barriers, the use of wall defenses, mighty armadas and trenches and tight ethno-religious groupings have been used as security strategies by nations to safeguard their territories from the foes’ invasion and other threats that may destabilize their society or even wipe out their civilization. The advent of the 20th century has seen airplanes, submarines, ballistic missiles, and weapons of mass destruction as new-fangled approaches to security. Since then, continuous innovations and revolutions have been made to satisfy standards of security. With this contemporary equipments and supplies, borders have become increasingly leaky thus the possibilities of breaking into the referent object’s realm. Consequently, destruction may just be seconds away to the very doorstep of territories on a scale previously not envisioned.
So to speak, we are living in a so called “borderless world.” This implies the continuing trend of globalization. This is the forcing factor that changes the international security landscape in a very drastic manner that it has compelled a fundamental reevaluation of security strategies. The global community has become interdependent, with the constant movement of people, ideas and goods. Migration, information, technology, ideas, goods and almost everything transferable are done conveniently. Given this fact, that we are in a borderless world, the threats that we face also have no borders and they continue to increase and break into every part of the globe. Endeavors are much more difficult to combat now and just as they are complex, the approaches should also be complex.
Perhaps, the toughest endeavor and threat that the international community is facing right now is terrorism. The recent significant terrorist attacks have put the issue of terrorism in a salient position where it is right now. Moreover, the threat of the use of nuclear terrorism likewise tends to make it even more worth the attention or limelight status on international peace and security.
The Seminar Paper
This paper will focus on Nuclear Terrorism’s threat to security particularly the menacing of terrorists to the international community on the acquisition, formulation, and use of nuclear weapons and devices as well as attacking or sabotaging their targets using stolen materials for the sinister purpose of mass destruction.
The primary concern of the paper is the securitization of nuclear terrorism and in doing this, I considered to divide it into three very important questions to dissect the larger remainder of the paper: first, why securitize it; second, how was it securitized; and third, what else can be done after such securitization to sustain the already laid down measures. But a short assessment of the security-terrorism nexus is definitely significant. It is considered in this paper.
Credible studies and analysis by scholars on global security and nuclear proliferation as well as organizations and groups inclined to the study of nuclear risks and counter-measures have been used lucratively as these are certainly important and helpful as a jumping ground for the seminar paper.
Accordingly, the questions of who are the securitizing actors, what is the referent object, what is the existential threat (because of which an issue has to be securitized; it is also the direct answer to why an issue is securitized) and how can it be securitize (what measures are not just available but more importantly, the most appropriate) will all be integrated into the three major questions supporting the primary concern of the paper: the securitization of the threat of nuclear terrorism.
Before fully gliding onto the nuclear terrorism threat proper of this paper, it is essential to primarily consider the arguments and other dimensions linking terrorism and security.
Terrorism and Security
Terrorism, in its real sense, has been existing since time immemorial but it was just in the most recent centuries when terrorism had become international community’s foremost opponent and its escalating threat has, for years, sort of “pressurized” the international audience and compel the authorities (practically, independent states) to ally their capacities to crash the terrors of today.
The strategy for terrorism has already been so apparent given countless incidents in almost all parts of the globe: it is the desperate attempt of a certain group to pressure its addressee (authority or government, including the population) and convince them to agree to their demands as to avoid future or further harms to the latter. Eventually, that existing government would get destabilized, a disgruntled population would the join an uprising by the threatening group thus the escalation of the conflict. Basing on historical events in the past, the common grounds of disputes are the following: secession of a territory to form a new sovereign state; dominance of territory or resources by various ethnic groups; imposition of a particular form of government, such as democracy, theocracy, or anarchy; economic deprivation of a population; and opposition to a domestic government or occupying army. Thirst for attention, pursuit for change, and expression of grievances are therefore the primary factors of their rebellious undertakings.
Kydd and Walter, in their article Strategies of Terrorism posited that terrorism is designed to change minds by destroying bodies. This may be interpreted as influencing people to sympathize with them in their goals but in making it possible, so many lives were negatively affected by their actions (destroying bodies) and worse, long term psychological effects or traumas to the victims. In their perspective of terrorism, they also considered that it is a form of costly signaling and employs five primary strategies of this: attrition, intimidation, provocation, spoiling, and outbidding. In an attrition strategy, terrorists seek to persuade the enemy that the terrorists are strong enough to impose considerable costs if the enemy continues a particular policy. Terrorists using intimidation try to convince the population that the terrorists are strong enough to punish disobedience and that the government is too weak to stop them, so that people behave as the terrorists wish. A provocation strategy is an attempt to induce the enemy to respond to terrorism with indiscriminate violence, which radicalizes the population and moves them to support the terrorists. Spoilers attack in an effort to persuade the enemy that moderates on the terrorists’ side are weak and untrustworthy, thus undermining attempts to reach a peace settlement. Groups engaged in outbidding use violence to convince the public that the terrorists have greater resolve to fight the enemy than rival groups, and therefore are worthy of support. Understanding these five distinct strategic logics is crucial not only for understanding terrorism but also for designing effective antiterrorism policies.[i]
Accordingly, the strategies being undertaken by the terrorists wish to signal that the latter have the capacity to impose costs on those who oppose them (their target, practically, the government and the population). However, the authors are also keen to the fact that each strategy works well under certain conditions only and poorly under others. Also, state responses to one strategy may be inappropriate for others.
Various measures have already been done to crash down terrorism but most governments are not that keen, sensitive or cautious if the suspicion followed by initial actions is reasonable. What must be behind the targeted group’s “terrorist” action? One dilemma that will emerge here is this: which side is really on the right position to say that their actions are reasonable, the State and the civilians which would argue that their security is the one that is more threatened by violent actions that would not only destabilize it (in the case of the State/ government) or injure them but worse, kill their loved ones (in the case of the civilians); OR is it the group who, because of fury and aggression, went to pressure the former so that it could have proportional rights or at least proper treatment from the State? They would also argue that they are more insecure because of the denial of their rights to decent living and other services that are supposedly to be provided by the government. It is actually not just concrete supplies and services that they are asking for but also proportional rights in terms of status as a minority or that feeling of being prejudiced.
Perhaps, one can attest to a more just image of the government and a negative image of the terrorists. On the other hand, one could strongly argue that it is the discriminated and/or unsatisfied people-turned-terrorists that should be considered more prone to other threats like incessant violence, disease and hunger in their far-flung and almost rejected places. This has become a dilemma to many contemporary scholars. It is very likely that “nagatungan” biases would further escalate debates on this issue.
To put it in a simpler way, the question here is “whose security should really be considered?”
This above-mentioned query was also asked by Brabazon but the approach was in light of the impacts of anti-terrorism legislations on civil liberties. After the 911 attack, most of the policies that were made aimed to further strengthen the capacity of the State to protect definite interests. Since then, a growing body of literature has developed examining the impact of anti-terrorism legislation on civil liberties, but very little addresses the impact of the legislation specifically on social movements or on dissent to the current configuration of power in their society more generally.[ii] Furthermore, his paper gives the reader preliminary analysis of the impact and potential impact of anti-terrorism legislation on social movements focusing on the possible political rationale behind such impacts. As Brabazon strongly asserted, the policies are designed directly or indirectly to protect the dominant economic project by criminalizing the social movements and community organizing that threatens it – in short, to criminalize dissent.
The wide array of literature (arguments, hypotheses, debates and dilemmas) about terrorism is indeed multi-dimensional. The questions raised are just portions of the evolving views, broadening dimensions and rising contentions on the terrorism-security knot. In the next portions of the paper, nonetheless, these questions may still and also be relevant. The focus of the paper would be the much more obvious but similarly important dimension of the many threats and security issues in relation to terrorism.
From “Mere” Terrorism to Nuclear Terrorism
When asked to picture a terrorist scenario, one would already think of suicide bombings in urban centers and major cities of the globe, exploding buses and trains, anthrax scare and other dissemination of toxic materials, harsh hostage scenarios and violent confrontations by the military and the terrorist groups.
In September 2001, there was the World Trade Center attack. On the same day, the “invincible” Pentagon was also attacked. Just few weeks after these incidents, was the sudden anthrax scare. Since then, the American nightmare has become much more imaginable not only to the Americans themselves but to the global community too. That was the beginning of the so-called (Global) War on Terrorism.
Prior to that, there had already been other relatively “minor” terrorist attacks in the Asia-Pacific region particularly in the Philippines by the Abu Sayyaf; ETA and IRA attacks in Europe particularly in Madrid and London, HAMAS attacks in the Middle East and so on. Subsequent to the famous 911 event, the attacks were already perceived as the terrorist network’s series of terror activities. The 911 became a benchmark event and the Al Qaeda terrorist group eventually became an internationally recognized but despised terrorist organization led by Bin Laden. In the course of that very recent and still vivid portion of modern history, the issue on religion-rooted and state-sponsored terrorism also escalated as well as an exaggerated discrimination to Arab-looking people and all those that have Arab-sounding names.
The intimidating menaces of the terrorist network are indeed seriously threatening to and crucial in international peace and security. What more if they go nuclear?
The war now is not actually between or among states. It is indeed a war on terrorism and the threat is worse: WHEN TERRORISTS GO NUCLEAR (Can terrorists really use nuclear weapons as their “newest” menacing thing? How big is the threat?)
The threat of nuclear terrorism is big.
It is very threatening. (emphasis)
The proliferation of nuclear weapons or radiological dispersal devices to terrorist groups can be considered as the gravest of all terrorist threats facing the international community especially the US which is at the forefront of major attacks. The possibility of terrorists constructing or obtaining a nuclear weapon and detonating it in a city is already recognized by many scholars, scientists, and policy-makers alike.
Nuclear materials, technologies and know-how are more widely available today than ever before. Small quantities of both fissile materials and highly radioactive materials, sufficient to manufacture a radiological dispersal device, are actively traded on the black market. Although terrorist groups are not suspected of actually acquiring such materials in large quantities, it is difficult to know for sure. A nuclear detonation by a terrorist group would likely result in an unprecedented number of casualties. In contrast, a radiological dispersal attack would probably be less violent, but could significantly contaminate an urban center, causing economic and social disruption. Also, both types of attacks would have significant psychological impacts on the entire population.[iii]
Why Securitize Nuclear Terrorism?
The outright answer for this is simply because it is a very obvious existential threat to the State. Terrorism itself is already a threat. What more if the way of executing such violence would be by the use of nuclear weapons, or the initial threat of the possibilities that these hazardous materials are in the hands of the terrorists and at any point of conflict, the dirty bomb would just exploded.
There are three major potential nuclear security threats: the acquisition of nuclear weapons by theft; the creation of nuclear explosive devices using stolen nuclear materials; and the use of these weapons. All these are possible actions that can be undertaken by terrorists posing a greater threat to security. Unlike during the Cold War when US and USSR (as the leading nuclear states) together with the others (France, Britain and China) are the only possible source of tension and fear for the international community, the threat is greater in that there are big possibilities of acquiring, building and using (and use for attack) these radioactive materials and nuclear weapons irresponsibly in the hands of terrorists. Adding to the already big threat are also the possibilities that Iran and North Korea Korea’s state sponsorship would also create greater tension not only to the most vulnerable of attacks but also to the international community.
Acquisition
Terrorists can acquire nuclear weapons by theft, procurement or manufacturing. Manufacturing cannot be done of there are no materials to use. Therefore, the primary concern is: where can they get these materials?
Roughly 30,000 nuclear weapons exist worldwide. Several hundred weapons are vulnerable to theft by terrorists or criminals who might sell them to terrorist organizations. It is clear that some such groups are interested in acquiring a nuclear device:
It seems improbable that a state would deliberately provide a nuclear weapon to a terrorist group unless it is a state-sponsored case. Fear of retribution from the attacked state and international community, potential loss of control over the nuclear-armed terrorist group, and a reluctance to surrender nuclear weapons to another party due to the intrinsic difficulty of acquiring them all mitigate against such state sponsorship.[iv]
Still, the United States and Russia maintain the world's largest nuclear stockpiles. While many nuclear weapons in Russia are adequately protected from theft, others are not. Many Soviet-era tactical nuclear devices are especially vulnerable, and given the smaller size of such weapons, would be particularly suitable for use by terrorists. The demise of the U.S.S.R. left the security of such materials in doubt, but as yet there is no evidence that any has fallen into the wrong hands.
Regarding the possibility of the Al Qaeda terrorists in acquiring materials, Dr. Gary Samore of the International Institute for Strategic Studies said "In the decade since the collapse of the Soviet Union, there is no documented case that we know of where a substantial quantity of weapons-grade material was offered for sale on the black market. As far as we know, no one has been able to acquire a substantial quantity of the material—much less create a weapon itself. Of course, one has to allow for the possibility that it's happened and we don't know about it, but so far it seems to be a horrible scenario that hasn't yet taken place."[v]
Another state that is seen as a possible source and manufacturing state is Pakistan. It is thought to have some 30-50 nuclear weapons, based on a stockpile of some 600-800 kilograms of HEU.[vi] Pakistan is now also producing weapons plutonium, but the amount produced to date is believed to be small, only enough for a handful of additional nuclear weapons.[vii]
A significant segment of Pakistani society holds extreme Islamic views and is sympathetic to the Taliban and al Qaeda. This includes some insiders within Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, as demonstrated by the case of Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, a former head of Pakistan's plutonium production who strongly supported the Taliban, met with Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan, and was placed under house arrest for a time on suspicion of passing nuclear secrets to bin Laden.[viii] The possibility that insiders would attempt to steal a nuclear weapon or nuclear material to make one, or to pass secrets on nuclear weapons design and assembly, is real. Hence, effective measures to address insider threats must be put in place at Pakistani nuclear weapons and nuclear material facilities.
Of where they can really acquire materials to use is still a puzzle. However, even if they can acquire, the next step is still difficult.
Building Weapons
The first question of building nuclear weapons by terrorists has already been addressed by many governments and by nongovernmental groups. Nuclear materials, technologies and know-how are more widely available today than ever before. Small quantities of fissile materials are actively traded on the black market. Although terrorist groups are not known to currently possess fissile materials in sufficient quantities to make nuclear explosives, they are known to have made attempts to acquire fissile materials.[ix]
The ability of a terrorist group to weaponize the fissile material into a nuclear weapon is difficult to assess. Even without direct state support, a well-funded, technically competent terrorist group could assemble the necessary skills and facilities to weaponize fissile material. Terrorist groups that are safely established within states would have a far easier time in researching and developing nuclear weapons, whether or not the state provided direct assistance to their nuclear efforts. Without the opportunity to work uninterrupted for a significant period of time, a terrorist group may find the task beyond its reach. If the terrorist group succeeded in obtaining fissile material, it would then be in the position to rapidly make a nuclear weapon.[x]
Use of Nuclear Weapons
The question about whether terrorists would use nuclear weapons is much more difficult to assess. Opinions on terrorism, however, are changing. In the past, analysts have regarded nuclear terrorism as unlikely, given the likely international backlash against such an attack. But now, a new breed of terrorists, motivated by religious rather than political goals, seem less concerned with the consequences of creating large numbers of casualties. Such groups might use nuclear weapons if given the chance.
Into Securitization
Given these concrete threats, we can already say that terrorism should definitely be securitized. But looking further, using the Copenhagen notion of securitization, what propelled the further securitization of terrorism from already a considered above politics issue? The notion simply puts it this way: securitization is the “move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics.”
I would like to put an emphasis on the fact that terrorism has already been considered an above politics issue even before the tragic 911 attacks. Since the dawn of the twentieth century, terrorism had already become a salient issue especially in conflict-ridden countries. The only distinct factor is that after 911, all the states’ independent treatment (national level security measures) of the issue as one that is above politics issue were all consolidated and integrated into the very fabric of a global war on terrorism (international level). Meaning, what really drove the states’ engine of politicization to a more intense level was the need for an allied, or perhaps a better term is interdependent, actions that would pursue policies and establish appropriate measures that could meet the real urgency of securitizing the issue of terrorism.
Interestingly, because of that rapid soar of the securitization of terrorism, it was not considered to be treated at all in a regional level. It was accelerated to an international level at once. This is because of the clear fact that although terrorism primarily thrives in independent conflict-ridden states, the effect of globalization has become an essential tool that even terrorists have had a network. This also brings us to the reality that terrorism cannot really be solved without international cooperation because after all, terrorism has become an international problem. (emphasis)
So why is there a need to put nuclear terrorism in an above-politics level? Any form of terrorism is simply terrorism itself. No matter what form it is, it is still that violent activity that should be toppled down immediately. Actually, the Global War on Terrorism by the US does not specifically pinpoint which form of terrorism should be knocked down first. That’s the very reason why it was called an all-out war on terrorism, meaning, there is a certain goal of completely obliterating terrorism from the face of the earth (not being pessimistic, but realistically speaking, that’s like reaching the moon in a day). Therefore, it doesn’t really matter if the threat is nuclear, chemical, biological, traditional weapons or other forms when realizing securitization of terrorism. At the end of the day, we still call all these forms of violence as terrorist activities.
There are immediate oppositions to this argument. One can say that there should always be a hierarchy of priorities insofar threat is concerned. Narrowing down to terrorism, an argument that may arise is that there are really weapons that are more dangerous and threatening compared with other weapons or forms of terrorism. Exploding a bus or mini-store is different from exploding a whole city. The case of Madrid bombings is different from the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings. Different levels and approaches should then be supplied. This line is argument is much more favorable and would put nuclear terrorism at the foremost concern in securitizing terrorism and other actions.
How was it securitized?
Considering first the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation, the most significant action providing this is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) of . It remains the global anchor for disarmament too. Although there are flaws in the system, its implementation continues to provide security benefits by proving assurance that nuclear energy is not misused for weapon purposes. Weapons can be advanced by nuclear technologies but responsible management of it is an imperative step. Although this said treaty is sometimes perceived as project of the industrialized states, it benefits as well other “weaker” states.
Although various efforts had already been done prior to and following the 911 to combat terrorism, it was just in 2005 that the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism was adopted by the United Nations.
The idea for a treaty on the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism originated in the 1990s in the wake of growing concerns about the threat of terrorists using nuclear or radiological material. Worries about terrorists gaining access to nuclear materials date back to earlier periods, as illustrated by the adoption in 1980 of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.[xi] The post-Cold War surge of fears about terrorism generally and, more specifically, terrorism involving biological, chemical, nuclear, or radiological agents led to the establishment by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in December 1996 of an Ad Hoc Committee mandated “to elaborate an international convention for the suppression of terrorist bombings and, subsequently, an international convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism, to supplement related existing international instruments, and thereafter to address means of further developing a comprehensive legal framework of conventions dealing with international terrorism[.]”[xii]
Since its establishment, the Ad Hoc Committee has produced three treaties that the UN General Assembly adopted and that have entered into force: the International Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (adopted in 1997; entered into force in 2001);[xiii] the International Convention on the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism (adopted in 1999; entered into force in 2002);[xiv] and the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (Convention) (adopted in 2005; entered into force in 2007).[xv] The Convention represents, therefore, the first anti-terrorism treaty adopted after September 11, 2001. Despite the relevance of many international legal instruments to nuclear terrorism, the UN General Assembly and the Ad Hoc Committee created the Convention because “existing multilateral legal provisions do not adequately address those attacks[.]”[xvi]
The Convention aims to address the unlawful possession or use of nuclear devices or materials by non-state actors. It calls for states to develop appropriate legal frameworks criminalizing nuclear terrorism-related offenses, investigate alleged offenses, and, as appropriate, arrest, prosecute, or extradite offenders. It also calls for international cooperation with nuclear terrorism investigations and prosecutions, through information-sharing, extradition and the transfer of detainees to assist with foreign investigations and prosecutions.[xvii]
The Nuclear Terrorism Convention speaks to values and themes articulated to varying degrees in the past by the United States and its allies. The following are the most important themes insofar combating terrorism by international cooperation is concerned:
a. outlawing and condemning terrorist activities
b. demonstrating global unity in opposition to terrorism
c. treating terrorism as a matter subject to domestic and international law
d. challenging states to use, and if necessary adapt, their domestic legal systems to combat terrorism
e. looking to states to cooperate as sovereign partners in the fight against terrorism, doing so within the context of domestic legal actions, as well as through related international mechanisms such as sovereign-to-sovereign extradition (but, as mentioned above, not by utilizing a free-standing international bureaucracy like the ICC, differences over which have contributed to Transatlantic friction)
f. using the United Nations as an international forum to develop inter-state cooperation, as a gathering place for sovereign partners
g. using international law as a basis and framework for action, and using the United Nations as a forum for developing international law
As can be seen, these themes touch on values held, for example, by both Europe and the United States. It gives security a high priority; grounds security in law, including international law; is UN-centered; and is sovereignty-based, calling for international cooperation among independent sovereigns joined in a common cause and acting together or in parallel as sovereign partners.[xviii]
In the immediate year after the hallmark Convention, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism was launched. In the US-Russian joint-forces announcement of the Initiative, the states stated their “intention to pursue the necessary steps with all those who share (their)views to prevent the acquisition, transport, or use by terrorists of nuclear materials and radioactive substances or improvised explosive devices using such materials, as well as hostile actions against nuclear facilities.”[xix]
The objectives of this Initiative are reflected in the International Convention for the Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism, Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities as amended in 2005, the Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, and other international legal frameworks relevant to combating nuclear terrorism.
The two initiating states likewise called upon like-minded nations “to expand and accelerate efforts that develop partnership capacity to combat nuclear terrorism on a determined and systematic basis.” Together with other participating countries and interacting closely with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the States were determined to take the pertinent steps and approaches to assist participating states in improving their capabilities to: ensure accounting, control, and physical protection of nuclear material and radioactive substances, as well as security of nuclear facilities; detect and suppress illicit trafficking or other illicit activities involving such materials, especially measures to prevent their acquisition and use by terrorists; respond to and mitigate the consequences of acts of nuclear terrorism; ensure cooperation in the development of technical means to combat nuclear terrorism; ensure that law enforcement takes all possible measures to deny safe haven to terrorists seeking to acquire or use nuclear materials; and strengthen our respective national legal frameworks to ensure the effective prosecution of, and the certainty of punishment for, terrorists and those who facilitate such acts.[xx]
The launch of determined plans of action in the Initiative is a critical step toward developing a more interdependent and global network of partners to further prevent terrorists from acquiring and using nuclear weapons.
Considering all these efforts in securitizing the nuclear threat by terrorists, can we say that the threat has indeed been securitized?
The Copenhagen school of thought would affirm so. Waever argues that securitization is a speech act. It also has a certain rhetorical structure. In a securitization discourse, the issue at hand is presented as an utmost priority. Accordingly, by marking the issue with “security,” the actor is claiming that the issue requires and justifies the use of special procedures.
Securitization, through the speech act, does not happen simply because someone utters something about the issue in light of security. Although it can be reasonably considered as a very vital initial step for securitizing an issue because of the threat it poses, the utterance does not necessarily securitize an issue at hand, at once. The actor should likely be in a position of authority to the audience. By emphatically asserting and suggesting emergency actions to repel the threat, the securitization is being pushed through. But again, it does not complete the process right away. Extraordinary actions should follow.
Given the “utterance,” assertion, and a significant architecture of measures as essential factors in securitizing an issue, the International Convention on the Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism and other important resolutions and measures undertaken, therefore, make the issue of terrorism securitized.
Post-securitization
The efforts done for the securitization of nuclear terrorism cannot be fully considered great success if the measures planned and framed in the various conventions and initiatives will not be implemented appropriately. The continuous support by the affirming partners is very essential to sustain the initial steps that have been done.
The priority for all states must be accurately to account for and safeguard nuclear weapons and weapons-grade nuclear material from the irresponsible hands of terrorists. The international community should consider a key action in the hierarchy of priorities and that is to protect nuclear facilities, ensure that the acquisition of low-grade materials are blocked to deter the next steps of building and using of nuclear weapons by terrorists. Following that very primary step is assisting partners such as other states and advocates of anti-nuclear terrorism in developing programs and actions that encourage the responsible use of nuclear technology for scientific advancement instead of using it for damaging purposes.
These would really require vast undertakings, both financially and logistically. However, by doing so, the reaps are worth the efforts.
Limiting the growth of newly minted weapons and material from reaching the market is also an important step. In this way, the goals of the Nuclear Terrorism Convention and the decades-old NPT will not be left unachieved.
Conclusion
Perhaps, a considerably significant event in the past 60 years is the one that did not happen: the use of a nuclear weapon in conflict. The next question is “can it still be prevented?” This feat of preventing the construction and deployment of nuclear weapons by a large number of nations may be considered an accomplishment. And although there are yet big threats of its use by Pakistan, Iran and North Korea, the fact that nuclear weapons have not been used is rather admirable. But the international community cannot loosen up in spite of the many accomplishments and continuous support from the international community, for the threat is still here.
The nuclear threat might stay for long. The use of nuclear technology in any major international dispute is inevitable. It has to be expected actually. In time, new players and powers will emerge. The possibilities of worst scenarios in world war and a more troubled earth should be expected.
Even if the nightmare of Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombs is almost fading, if not long-gone, it still poses back the perils of the nuclear threat. The terrorist nuclear threat still exists. In spite of securitization efforts, the threat is still seen just like a bomb that when left unsecured, will just explode and make severe damages.
Securitizing the threat of nuclear terrorism will always be dared by the enemies of peace and security. Those people who continue to create tension will find their consequence in time. I have no right to condemn the terrorists. Nonetheless, I wholly condemn their way of expressing their want for change and hunger for attention. Those who tirelessly find solutions to solve the problem and encourage peaceful means of expression are commendable. Referring the government as the sole protagonist in this story of terrorism is contentious. The people behind “dirty weapons” are also victims – corrupted by the curse that trapped mankind into the quagmire of other threats it still struggles to battle with.
[i] Kydd, Andrew H., and Barbara F. Walter. "The Strategies of Terrorism." International Security 31, no. 1 (Summer 2006): 49-80.
[ii] Brabazon, Honor. “Protecting Whose Security?: Anti-Terrorism Legislation and the Criminalization of Dissent.” YCISS Working Paper Number 43, December 2006
[iii] O’Neill, Kevin. “The Nuclear Terrorist Threat.” Institute for Science and International Security, 1997
[iv] Cameron, Gavin. “Nuclear Terrorism: Weapons for Sale or Theft?” 2005
[v] Handwerk, Brian. “Nuclear Terrorism—How Great is the Threat?” 2002
[vi] Albright, David. "India's and Pakistan's Fissile Material and Nuclear Weapons Inventories, End of 1999"
[vii] Ibid
[viii] See, for example, Peter Baker, "Pakistani Scientist Who Met Bin Laden Failed Polygraphs, Renewing Suspicions," Washington Post, March 3, 2002.
[ix] Albright, David, Kevin O'Neill and Corey Hinderstein. “Nuclear Terrorism: The Unthinkable Nightmare.” ISIS, 2001
[x] Ibid
[xi] Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 3 Mar. 1980, 1987 UNTS 125, entered into force 8 Feb. 1987.
[xii] UN General Assembly Resolution 51/210, 17 Dec. 1996, p. 5.
[xiii] International Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, UN General Assembly Resolution 52/164, 15 Dec. 1997, entered into force 23 May 2001.
[xiv] International Convention on the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism, UN General Assembly Resolution 54/109, 9 Dec. 1999, entered into force 10 Apr. 2002.
[xv] The Ad Hoc Committee is also charged with developing a comprehensive treaty on terrorism.
[xvi] Convention, supra note 1, preamble.
[xvii] Welsh, Steven. “Nuclear Terrorism Convention: International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.” 2005.
[xviii] Ibid
[xix] Announcing the Global Initiative To Combat Nuclear Terrorism, US Department of State, 2006
[xx] Ibid
Aaron Grajo Laylo
In November 2001, as U.S. warplanes flew over Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden told a nerve-racking statement to Pakistani journalist Hamid Mira, “Al Qaeda had access to nuclear weapons and would not hesitate to use them for "self-defense."
Days are already dangerous and getting even more dangerous as dissenters make use of the latest and highly-developed machineries, tools and equipment in technology to frighten people and pressure governments to the extent of spurring discord within the latter. Eventually, referent objects, being the constant target of terrorist attacks and after being choked by threats, may get destabilized in the absence of pertinent security measures.
For years, strategic placement of cities and borders along coasts or natural barriers, the use of wall defenses, mighty armadas and trenches and tight ethno-religious groupings have been used as security strategies by nations to safeguard their territories from the foes’ invasion and other threats that may destabilize their society or even wipe out their civilization. The advent of the 20th century has seen airplanes, submarines, ballistic missiles, and weapons of mass destruction as new-fangled approaches to security. Since then, continuous innovations and revolutions have been made to satisfy standards of security. With this contemporary equipments and supplies, borders have become increasingly leaky thus the possibilities of breaking into the referent object’s realm. Consequently, destruction may just be seconds away to the very doorstep of territories on a scale previously not envisioned.
So to speak, we are living in a so called “borderless world.” This implies the continuing trend of globalization. This is the forcing factor that changes the international security landscape in a very drastic manner that it has compelled a fundamental reevaluation of security strategies. The global community has become interdependent, with the constant movement of people, ideas and goods. Migration, information, technology, ideas, goods and almost everything transferable are done conveniently. Given this fact, that we are in a borderless world, the threats that we face also have no borders and they continue to increase and break into every part of the globe. Endeavors are much more difficult to combat now and just as they are complex, the approaches should also be complex.
Perhaps, the toughest endeavor and threat that the international community is facing right now is terrorism. The recent significant terrorist attacks have put the issue of terrorism in a salient position where it is right now. Moreover, the threat of the use of nuclear terrorism likewise tends to make it even more worth the attention or limelight status on international peace and security.
The Seminar Paper
This paper will focus on Nuclear Terrorism’s threat to security particularly the menacing of terrorists to the international community on the acquisition, formulation, and use of nuclear weapons and devices as well as attacking or sabotaging their targets using stolen materials for the sinister purpose of mass destruction.
The primary concern of the paper is the securitization of nuclear terrorism and in doing this, I considered to divide it into three very important questions to dissect the larger remainder of the paper: first, why securitize it; second, how was it securitized; and third, what else can be done after such securitization to sustain the already laid down measures. But a short assessment of the security-terrorism nexus is definitely significant. It is considered in this paper.
Credible studies and analysis by scholars on global security and nuclear proliferation as well as organizations and groups inclined to the study of nuclear risks and counter-measures have been used lucratively as these are certainly important and helpful as a jumping ground for the seminar paper.
Accordingly, the questions of who are the securitizing actors, what is the referent object, what is the existential threat (because of which an issue has to be securitized; it is also the direct answer to why an issue is securitized) and how can it be securitize (what measures are not just available but more importantly, the most appropriate) will all be integrated into the three major questions supporting the primary concern of the paper: the securitization of the threat of nuclear terrorism.
Before fully gliding onto the nuclear terrorism threat proper of this paper, it is essential to primarily consider the arguments and other dimensions linking terrorism and security.
Terrorism and Security
Terrorism, in its real sense, has been existing since time immemorial but it was just in the most recent centuries when terrorism had become international community’s foremost opponent and its escalating threat has, for years, sort of “pressurized” the international audience and compel the authorities (practically, independent states) to ally their capacities to crash the terrors of today.
The strategy for terrorism has already been so apparent given countless incidents in almost all parts of the globe: it is the desperate attempt of a certain group to pressure its addressee (authority or government, including the population) and convince them to agree to their demands as to avoid future or further harms to the latter. Eventually, that existing government would get destabilized, a disgruntled population would the join an uprising by the threatening group thus the escalation of the conflict. Basing on historical events in the past, the common grounds of disputes are the following: secession of a territory to form a new sovereign state; dominance of territory or resources by various ethnic groups; imposition of a particular form of government, such as democracy, theocracy, or anarchy; economic deprivation of a population; and opposition to a domestic government or occupying army. Thirst for attention, pursuit for change, and expression of grievances are therefore the primary factors of their rebellious undertakings.
Kydd and Walter, in their article Strategies of Terrorism posited that terrorism is designed to change minds by destroying bodies. This may be interpreted as influencing people to sympathize with them in their goals but in making it possible, so many lives were negatively affected by their actions (destroying bodies) and worse, long term psychological effects or traumas to the victims. In their perspective of terrorism, they also considered that it is a form of costly signaling and employs five primary strategies of this: attrition, intimidation, provocation, spoiling, and outbidding. In an attrition strategy, terrorists seek to persuade the enemy that the terrorists are strong enough to impose considerable costs if the enemy continues a particular policy. Terrorists using intimidation try to convince the population that the terrorists are strong enough to punish disobedience and that the government is too weak to stop them, so that people behave as the terrorists wish. A provocation strategy is an attempt to induce the enemy to respond to terrorism with indiscriminate violence, which radicalizes the population and moves them to support the terrorists. Spoilers attack in an effort to persuade the enemy that moderates on the terrorists’ side are weak and untrustworthy, thus undermining attempts to reach a peace settlement. Groups engaged in outbidding use violence to convince the public that the terrorists have greater resolve to fight the enemy than rival groups, and therefore are worthy of support. Understanding these five distinct strategic logics is crucial not only for understanding terrorism but also for designing effective antiterrorism policies.[i]
Accordingly, the strategies being undertaken by the terrorists wish to signal that the latter have the capacity to impose costs on those who oppose them (their target, practically, the government and the population). However, the authors are also keen to the fact that each strategy works well under certain conditions only and poorly under others. Also, state responses to one strategy may be inappropriate for others.
Various measures have already been done to crash down terrorism but most governments are not that keen, sensitive or cautious if the suspicion followed by initial actions is reasonable. What must be behind the targeted group’s “terrorist” action? One dilemma that will emerge here is this: which side is really on the right position to say that their actions are reasonable, the State and the civilians which would argue that their security is the one that is more threatened by violent actions that would not only destabilize it (in the case of the State/ government) or injure them but worse, kill their loved ones (in the case of the civilians); OR is it the group who, because of fury and aggression, went to pressure the former so that it could have proportional rights or at least proper treatment from the State? They would also argue that they are more insecure because of the denial of their rights to decent living and other services that are supposedly to be provided by the government. It is actually not just concrete supplies and services that they are asking for but also proportional rights in terms of status as a minority or that feeling of being prejudiced.
Perhaps, one can attest to a more just image of the government and a negative image of the terrorists. On the other hand, one could strongly argue that it is the discriminated and/or unsatisfied people-turned-terrorists that should be considered more prone to other threats like incessant violence, disease and hunger in their far-flung and almost rejected places. This has become a dilemma to many contemporary scholars. It is very likely that “nagatungan” biases would further escalate debates on this issue.
To put it in a simpler way, the question here is “whose security should really be considered?”
This above-mentioned query was also asked by Brabazon but the approach was in light of the impacts of anti-terrorism legislations on civil liberties. After the 911 attack, most of the policies that were made aimed to further strengthen the capacity of the State to protect definite interests. Since then, a growing body of literature has developed examining the impact of anti-terrorism legislation on civil liberties, but very little addresses the impact of the legislation specifically on social movements or on dissent to the current configuration of power in their society more generally.[ii] Furthermore, his paper gives the reader preliminary analysis of the impact and potential impact of anti-terrorism legislation on social movements focusing on the possible political rationale behind such impacts. As Brabazon strongly asserted, the policies are designed directly or indirectly to protect the dominant economic project by criminalizing the social movements and community organizing that threatens it – in short, to criminalize dissent.
The wide array of literature (arguments, hypotheses, debates and dilemmas) about terrorism is indeed multi-dimensional. The questions raised are just portions of the evolving views, broadening dimensions and rising contentions on the terrorism-security knot. In the next portions of the paper, nonetheless, these questions may still and also be relevant. The focus of the paper would be the much more obvious but similarly important dimension of the many threats and security issues in relation to terrorism.
From “Mere” Terrorism to Nuclear Terrorism
When asked to picture a terrorist scenario, one would already think of suicide bombings in urban centers and major cities of the globe, exploding buses and trains, anthrax scare and other dissemination of toxic materials, harsh hostage scenarios and violent confrontations by the military and the terrorist groups.
In September 2001, there was the World Trade Center attack. On the same day, the “invincible” Pentagon was also attacked. Just few weeks after these incidents, was the sudden anthrax scare. Since then, the American nightmare has become much more imaginable not only to the Americans themselves but to the global community too. That was the beginning of the so-called (Global) War on Terrorism.
Prior to that, there had already been other relatively “minor” terrorist attacks in the Asia-Pacific region particularly in the Philippines by the Abu Sayyaf; ETA and IRA attacks in Europe particularly in Madrid and London, HAMAS attacks in the Middle East and so on. Subsequent to the famous 911 event, the attacks were already perceived as the terrorist network’s series of terror activities. The 911 became a benchmark event and the Al Qaeda terrorist group eventually became an internationally recognized but despised terrorist organization led by Bin Laden. In the course of that very recent and still vivid portion of modern history, the issue on religion-rooted and state-sponsored terrorism also escalated as well as an exaggerated discrimination to Arab-looking people and all those that have Arab-sounding names.
The intimidating menaces of the terrorist network are indeed seriously threatening to and crucial in international peace and security. What more if they go nuclear?
The war now is not actually between or among states. It is indeed a war on terrorism and the threat is worse: WHEN TERRORISTS GO NUCLEAR (Can terrorists really use nuclear weapons as their “newest” menacing thing? How big is the threat?)
The threat of nuclear terrorism is big.
It is very threatening. (emphasis)
The proliferation of nuclear weapons or radiological dispersal devices to terrorist groups can be considered as the gravest of all terrorist threats facing the international community especially the US which is at the forefront of major attacks. The possibility of terrorists constructing or obtaining a nuclear weapon and detonating it in a city is already recognized by many scholars, scientists, and policy-makers alike.
Nuclear materials, technologies and know-how are more widely available today than ever before. Small quantities of both fissile materials and highly radioactive materials, sufficient to manufacture a radiological dispersal device, are actively traded on the black market. Although terrorist groups are not suspected of actually acquiring such materials in large quantities, it is difficult to know for sure. A nuclear detonation by a terrorist group would likely result in an unprecedented number of casualties. In contrast, a radiological dispersal attack would probably be less violent, but could significantly contaminate an urban center, causing economic and social disruption. Also, both types of attacks would have significant psychological impacts on the entire population.[iii]
Why Securitize Nuclear Terrorism?
The outright answer for this is simply because it is a very obvious existential threat to the State. Terrorism itself is already a threat. What more if the way of executing such violence would be by the use of nuclear weapons, or the initial threat of the possibilities that these hazardous materials are in the hands of the terrorists and at any point of conflict, the dirty bomb would just exploded.
There are three major potential nuclear security threats: the acquisition of nuclear weapons by theft; the creation of nuclear explosive devices using stolen nuclear materials; and the use of these weapons. All these are possible actions that can be undertaken by terrorists posing a greater threat to security. Unlike during the Cold War when US and USSR (as the leading nuclear states) together with the others (France, Britain and China) are the only possible source of tension and fear for the international community, the threat is greater in that there are big possibilities of acquiring, building and using (and use for attack) these radioactive materials and nuclear weapons irresponsibly in the hands of terrorists. Adding to the already big threat are also the possibilities that Iran and North Korea Korea’s state sponsorship would also create greater tension not only to the most vulnerable of attacks but also to the international community.
Acquisition
Terrorists can acquire nuclear weapons by theft, procurement or manufacturing. Manufacturing cannot be done of there are no materials to use. Therefore, the primary concern is: where can they get these materials?
Roughly 30,000 nuclear weapons exist worldwide. Several hundred weapons are vulnerable to theft by terrorists or criminals who might sell them to terrorist organizations. It is clear that some such groups are interested in acquiring a nuclear device:
It seems improbable that a state would deliberately provide a nuclear weapon to a terrorist group unless it is a state-sponsored case. Fear of retribution from the attacked state and international community, potential loss of control over the nuclear-armed terrorist group, and a reluctance to surrender nuclear weapons to another party due to the intrinsic difficulty of acquiring them all mitigate against such state sponsorship.[iv]
Still, the United States and Russia maintain the world's largest nuclear stockpiles. While many nuclear weapons in Russia are adequately protected from theft, others are not. Many Soviet-era tactical nuclear devices are especially vulnerable, and given the smaller size of such weapons, would be particularly suitable for use by terrorists. The demise of the U.S.S.R. left the security of such materials in doubt, but as yet there is no evidence that any has fallen into the wrong hands.
Regarding the possibility of the Al Qaeda terrorists in acquiring materials, Dr. Gary Samore of the International Institute for Strategic Studies said "In the decade since the collapse of the Soviet Union, there is no documented case that we know of where a substantial quantity of weapons-grade material was offered for sale on the black market. As far as we know, no one has been able to acquire a substantial quantity of the material—much less create a weapon itself. Of course, one has to allow for the possibility that it's happened and we don't know about it, but so far it seems to be a horrible scenario that hasn't yet taken place."[v]
Another state that is seen as a possible source and manufacturing state is Pakistan. It is thought to have some 30-50 nuclear weapons, based on a stockpile of some 600-800 kilograms of HEU.[vi] Pakistan is now also producing weapons plutonium, but the amount produced to date is believed to be small, only enough for a handful of additional nuclear weapons.[vii]
A significant segment of Pakistani society holds extreme Islamic views and is sympathetic to the Taliban and al Qaeda. This includes some insiders within Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, as demonstrated by the case of Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, a former head of Pakistan's plutonium production who strongly supported the Taliban, met with Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan, and was placed under house arrest for a time on suspicion of passing nuclear secrets to bin Laden.[viii] The possibility that insiders would attempt to steal a nuclear weapon or nuclear material to make one, or to pass secrets on nuclear weapons design and assembly, is real. Hence, effective measures to address insider threats must be put in place at Pakistani nuclear weapons and nuclear material facilities.
Of where they can really acquire materials to use is still a puzzle. However, even if they can acquire, the next step is still difficult.
Building Weapons
The first question of building nuclear weapons by terrorists has already been addressed by many governments and by nongovernmental groups. Nuclear materials, technologies and know-how are more widely available today than ever before. Small quantities of fissile materials are actively traded on the black market. Although terrorist groups are not known to currently possess fissile materials in sufficient quantities to make nuclear explosives, they are known to have made attempts to acquire fissile materials.[ix]
The ability of a terrorist group to weaponize the fissile material into a nuclear weapon is difficult to assess. Even without direct state support, a well-funded, technically competent terrorist group could assemble the necessary skills and facilities to weaponize fissile material. Terrorist groups that are safely established within states would have a far easier time in researching and developing nuclear weapons, whether or not the state provided direct assistance to their nuclear efforts. Without the opportunity to work uninterrupted for a significant period of time, a terrorist group may find the task beyond its reach. If the terrorist group succeeded in obtaining fissile material, it would then be in the position to rapidly make a nuclear weapon.[x]
Use of Nuclear Weapons
The question about whether terrorists would use nuclear weapons is much more difficult to assess. Opinions on terrorism, however, are changing. In the past, analysts have regarded nuclear terrorism as unlikely, given the likely international backlash against such an attack. But now, a new breed of terrorists, motivated by religious rather than political goals, seem less concerned with the consequences of creating large numbers of casualties. Such groups might use nuclear weapons if given the chance.
Into Securitization
Given these concrete threats, we can already say that terrorism should definitely be securitized. But looking further, using the Copenhagen notion of securitization, what propelled the further securitization of terrorism from already a considered above politics issue? The notion simply puts it this way: securitization is the “move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics.”
I would like to put an emphasis on the fact that terrorism has already been considered an above politics issue even before the tragic 911 attacks. Since the dawn of the twentieth century, terrorism had already become a salient issue especially in conflict-ridden countries. The only distinct factor is that after 911, all the states’ independent treatment (national level security measures) of the issue as one that is above politics issue were all consolidated and integrated into the very fabric of a global war on terrorism (international level). Meaning, what really drove the states’ engine of politicization to a more intense level was the need for an allied, or perhaps a better term is interdependent, actions that would pursue policies and establish appropriate measures that could meet the real urgency of securitizing the issue of terrorism.
Interestingly, because of that rapid soar of the securitization of terrorism, it was not considered to be treated at all in a regional level. It was accelerated to an international level at once. This is because of the clear fact that although terrorism primarily thrives in independent conflict-ridden states, the effect of globalization has become an essential tool that even terrorists have had a network. This also brings us to the reality that terrorism cannot really be solved without international cooperation because after all, terrorism has become an international problem. (emphasis)
So why is there a need to put nuclear terrorism in an above-politics level? Any form of terrorism is simply terrorism itself. No matter what form it is, it is still that violent activity that should be toppled down immediately. Actually, the Global War on Terrorism by the US does not specifically pinpoint which form of terrorism should be knocked down first. That’s the very reason why it was called an all-out war on terrorism, meaning, there is a certain goal of completely obliterating terrorism from the face of the earth (not being pessimistic, but realistically speaking, that’s like reaching the moon in a day). Therefore, it doesn’t really matter if the threat is nuclear, chemical, biological, traditional weapons or other forms when realizing securitization of terrorism. At the end of the day, we still call all these forms of violence as terrorist activities.
There are immediate oppositions to this argument. One can say that there should always be a hierarchy of priorities insofar threat is concerned. Narrowing down to terrorism, an argument that may arise is that there are really weapons that are more dangerous and threatening compared with other weapons or forms of terrorism. Exploding a bus or mini-store is different from exploding a whole city. The case of Madrid bombings is different from the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings. Different levels and approaches should then be supplied. This line is argument is much more favorable and would put nuclear terrorism at the foremost concern in securitizing terrorism and other actions.
How was it securitized?
Considering first the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation, the most significant action providing this is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) of . It remains the global anchor for disarmament too. Although there are flaws in the system, its implementation continues to provide security benefits by proving assurance that nuclear energy is not misused for weapon purposes. Weapons can be advanced by nuclear technologies but responsible management of it is an imperative step. Although this said treaty is sometimes perceived as project of the industrialized states, it benefits as well other “weaker” states.
Although various efforts had already been done prior to and following the 911 to combat terrorism, it was just in 2005 that the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism was adopted by the United Nations.
The idea for a treaty on the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism originated in the 1990s in the wake of growing concerns about the threat of terrorists using nuclear or radiological material. Worries about terrorists gaining access to nuclear materials date back to earlier periods, as illustrated by the adoption in 1980 of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.[xi] The post-Cold War surge of fears about terrorism generally and, more specifically, terrorism involving biological, chemical, nuclear, or radiological agents led to the establishment by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in December 1996 of an Ad Hoc Committee mandated “to elaborate an international convention for the suppression of terrorist bombings and, subsequently, an international convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism, to supplement related existing international instruments, and thereafter to address means of further developing a comprehensive legal framework of conventions dealing with international terrorism[.]”[xii]
Since its establishment, the Ad Hoc Committee has produced three treaties that the UN General Assembly adopted and that have entered into force: the International Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (adopted in 1997; entered into force in 2001);[xiii] the International Convention on the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism (adopted in 1999; entered into force in 2002);[xiv] and the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (Convention) (adopted in 2005; entered into force in 2007).[xv] The Convention represents, therefore, the first anti-terrorism treaty adopted after September 11, 2001. Despite the relevance of many international legal instruments to nuclear terrorism, the UN General Assembly and the Ad Hoc Committee created the Convention because “existing multilateral legal provisions do not adequately address those attacks[.]”[xvi]
The Convention aims to address the unlawful possession or use of nuclear devices or materials by non-state actors. It calls for states to develop appropriate legal frameworks criminalizing nuclear terrorism-related offenses, investigate alleged offenses, and, as appropriate, arrest, prosecute, or extradite offenders. It also calls for international cooperation with nuclear terrorism investigations and prosecutions, through information-sharing, extradition and the transfer of detainees to assist with foreign investigations and prosecutions.[xvii]
The Nuclear Terrorism Convention speaks to values and themes articulated to varying degrees in the past by the United States and its allies. The following are the most important themes insofar combating terrorism by international cooperation is concerned:
a. outlawing and condemning terrorist activities
b. demonstrating global unity in opposition to terrorism
c. treating terrorism as a matter subject to domestic and international law
d. challenging states to use, and if necessary adapt, their domestic legal systems to combat terrorism
e. looking to states to cooperate as sovereign partners in the fight against terrorism, doing so within the context of domestic legal actions, as well as through related international mechanisms such as sovereign-to-sovereign extradition (but, as mentioned above, not by utilizing a free-standing international bureaucracy like the ICC, differences over which have contributed to Transatlantic friction)
f. using the United Nations as an international forum to develop inter-state cooperation, as a gathering place for sovereign partners
g. using international law as a basis and framework for action, and using the United Nations as a forum for developing international law
As can be seen, these themes touch on values held, for example, by both Europe and the United States. It gives security a high priority; grounds security in law, including international law; is UN-centered; and is sovereignty-based, calling for international cooperation among independent sovereigns joined in a common cause and acting together or in parallel as sovereign partners.[xviii]
In the immediate year after the hallmark Convention, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism was launched. In the US-Russian joint-forces announcement of the Initiative, the states stated their “intention to pursue the necessary steps with all those who share (their)views to prevent the acquisition, transport, or use by terrorists of nuclear materials and radioactive substances or improvised explosive devices using such materials, as well as hostile actions against nuclear facilities.”[xix]
The objectives of this Initiative are reflected in the International Convention for the Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism, Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities as amended in 2005, the Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, and other international legal frameworks relevant to combating nuclear terrorism.
The two initiating states likewise called upon like-minded nations “to expand and accelerate efforts that develop partnership capacity to combat nuclear terrorism on a determined and systematic basis.” Together with other participating countries and interacting closely with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the States were determined to take the pertinent steps and approaches to assist participating states in improving their capabilities to: ensure accounting, control, and physical protection of nuclear material and radioactive substances, as well as security of nuclear facilities; detect and suppress illicit trafficking or other illicit activities involving such materials, especially measures to prevent their acquisition and use by terrorists; respond to and mitigate the consequences of acts of nuclear terrorism; ensure cooperation in the development of technical means to combat nuclear terrorism; ensure that law enforcement takes all possible measures to deny safe haven to terrorists seeking to acquire or use nuclear materials; and strengthen our respective national legal frameworks to ensure the effective prosecution of, and the certainty of punishment for, terrorists and those who facilitate such acts.[xx]
The launch of determined plans of action in the Initiative is a critical step toward developing a more interdependent and global network of partners to further prevent terrorists from acquiring and using nuclear weapons.
Considering all these efforts in securitizing the nuclear threat by terrorists, can we say that the threat has indeed been securitized?
The Copenhagen school of thought would affirm so. Waever argues that securitization is a speech act. It also has a certain rhetorical structure. In a securitization discourse, the issue at hand is presented as an utmost priority. Accordingly, by marking the issue with “security,” the actor is claiming that the issue requires and justifies the use of special procedures.
Securitization, through the speech act, does not happen simply because someone utters something about the issue in light of security. Although it can be reasonably considered as a very vital initial step for securitizing an issue because of the threat it poses, the utterance does not necessarily securitize an issue at hand, at once. The actor should likely be in a position of authority to the audience. By emphatically asserting and suggesting emergency actions to repel the threat, the securitization is being pushed through. But again, it does not complete the process right away. Extraordinary actions should follow.
Given the “utterance,” assertion, and a significant architecture of measures as essential factors in securitizing an issue, the International Convention on the Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism and other important resolutions and measures undertaken, therefore, make the issue of terrorism securitized.
Post-securitization
The efforts done for the securitization of nuclear terrorism cannot be fully considered great success if the measures planned and framed in the various conventions and initiatives will not be implemented appropriately. The continuous support by the affirming partners is very essential to sustain the initial steps that have been done.
The priority for all states must be accurately to account for and safeguard nuclear weapons and weapons-grade nuclear material from the irresponsible hands of terrorists. The international community should consider a key action in the hierarchy of priorities and that is to protect nuclear facilities, ensure that the acquisition of low-grade materials are blocked to deter the next steps of building and using of nuclear weapons by terrorists. Following that very primary step is assisting partners such as other states and advocates of anti-nuclear terrorism in developing programs and actions that encourage the responsible use of nuclear technology for scientific advancement instead of using it for damaging purposes.
These would really require vast undertakings, both financially and logistically. However, by doing so, the reaps are worth the efforts.
Limiting the growth of newly minted weapons and material from reaching the market is also an important step. In this way, the goals of the Nuclear Terrorism Convention and the decades-old NPT will not be left unachieved.
Conclusion
Perhaps, a considerably significant event in the past 60 years is the one that did not happen: the use of a nuclear weapon in conflict. The next question is “can it still be prevented?” This feat of preventing the construction and deployment of nuclear weapons by a large number of nations may be considered an accomplishment. And although there are yet big threats of its use by Pakistan, Iran and North Korea, the fact that nuclear weapons have not been used is rather admirable. But the international community cannot loosen up in spite of the many accomplishments and continuous support from the international community, for the threat is still here.
The nuclear threat might stay for long. The use of nuclear technology in any major international dispute is inevitable. It has to be expected actually. In time, new players and powers will emerge. The possibilities of worst scenarios in world war and a more troubled earth should be expected.
Even if the nightmare of Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombs is almost fading, if not long-gone, it still poses back the perils of the nuclear threat. The terrorist nuclear threat still exists. In spite of securitization efforts, the threat is still seen just like a bomb that when left unsecured, will just explode and make severe damages.
Securitizing the threat of nuclear terrorism will always be dared by the enemies of peace and security. Those people who continue to create tension will find their consequence in time. I have no right to condemn the terrorists. Nonetheless, I wholly condemn their way of expressing their want for change and hunger for attention. Those who tirelessly find solutions to solve the problem and encourage peaceful means of expression are commendable. Referring the government as the sole protagonist in this story of terrorism is contentious. The people behind “dirty weapons” are also victims – corrupted by the curse that trapped mankind into the quagmire of other threats it still struggles to battle with.
[i] Kydd, Andrew H., and Barbara F. Walter. "The Strategies of Terrorism." International Security 31, no. 1 (Summer 2006): 49-80.
[ii] Brabazon, Honor. “Protecting Whose Security?: Anti-Terrorism Legislation and the Criminalization of Dissent.” YCISS Working Paper Number 43, December 2006
[iii] O’Neill, Kevin. “The Nuclear Terrorist Threat.” Institute for Science and International Security, 1997
[iv] Cameron, Gavin. “Nuclear Terrorism: Weapons for Sale or Theft?” 2005
[v] Handwerk, Brian. “Nuclear Terrorism—How Great is the Threat?” 2002
[vi] Albright, David. "India's and Pakistan's Fissile Material and Nuclear Weapons Inventories, End of 1999"
[vii] Ibid
[viii] See, for example, Peter Baker, "Pakistani Scientist Who Met Bin Laden Failed Polygraphs, Renewing Suspicions," Washington Post, March 3, 2002.
[ix] Albright, David, Kevin O'Neill and Corey Hinderstein. “Nuclear Terrorism: The Unthinkable Nightmare.” ISIS, 2001
[x] Ibid
[xi] Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 3 Mar. 1980, 1987 UNTS 125, entered into force 8 Feb. 1987.
[xii] UN General Assembly Resolution 51/210, 17 Dec. 1996, p. 5.
[xiii] International Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, UN General Assembly Resolution 52/164, 15 Dec. 1997, entered into force 23 May 2001.
[xiv] International Convention on the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism, UN General Assembly Resolution 54/109, 9 Dec. 1999, entered into force 10 Apr. 2002.
[xv] The Ad Hoc Committee is also charged with developing a comprehensive treaty on terrorism.
[xvi] Convention, supra note 1, preamble.
[xvii] Welsh, Steven. “Nuclear Terrorism Convention: International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.” 2005.
[xviii] Ibid
[xix] Announcing the Global Initiative To Combat Nuclear Terrorism, US Department of State, 2006
[xx] Ibid
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