INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS (IDPs): WHERE HAVE THEY GONE?
An Overview of Selected Countries with a Significant Number of Armed Conflict-caused Internal Displacements: Crises, Trends and Probable Solutions
Aaron Laylo
Abstract
This paper gives an overview of the internal displacement predicament as a global crisis. It also explores significant incidences of internal displacement in selected countries from various regions on levels and causes varying from but focusing on armed conflicts and political repression over guerilla or religious groups to human rights violations and the “negligence” of the international community, and other threats and vulnerabilities common to these homeless people. The paper aims and seeks to answer a very significant question addressing the dispossessed and displaced population’s plight and given the other realities behind this global crisis: Where have they gone?
INTRODUCTION
The Subject
They are people who run from one place to another, settle for a while, and run again to look for a place which, even for a short while, they can call “home.” They are left homeless because of almost endless military confrontations between the government and armed civilians. They are forced to move out of their comfort zones and be swayed to another soil within their state’s borders only to find themselves strangers in their own land. They are “orphans of conflict.”[i]
There are about 25 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) who were uprooted from their homes for the same reasons as refugees but have not crossed any international border. Considered the most vulnerable in their nation’s populations, their journey to find a place to call home where they could feel secure seems to be a very tiring one. They usually come from disadvantaged and poverty-stricken communities that are caught between the harshest of state and anti-state group confrontations.
The post-Cold War era saw the increasing number of these people in all continents of the world. Their plight has become a global crisis and continually poses great challenges for the international community to establish appropriate programs of actions that involve systems of humanitarian relief, aid and protection.
This paper aims to ask one significant question: “Where have they gone?” This attempts to follow the course of the internally displaced from being disadvantaged members of their state’s tearing society to becoming the “left behind” and continually experiencing the perennial plight where they have gotten wounded ankles, scratched skin, and weary bodies. More than the physical harms and injuries, simple lives are also getting torn into pieces in this trail of pain and constant struggles with armed conflict, dispossession and starvation.
The Paper
The paper seeks to understand the internal displacement predicament by unlocking the following points: a) Who are the internally displaced persons? How do they differ from refugees? b) What are the common causes of the incidence of internal displacement?; c) Who are the actors and other players in this naturally domestic but internationally-dealt with problem?; and d) Why is it considered a global crisis? Answering these questions would make up the first section of the paper. Also, a portion of this section gives an overview of figures and trends in continents where internal displacement is prevalent.
The second part of this paper presents an overview of four selected significant cases of internal displacement from three countries and one continent. Each case offers a different situation and setting of conflict although all cases are bound to armed-conflict induced internal displacement.
The last part of the seminar paper presents critical analyses and arguments regarding human rights protection against violations, challenges, responsibilities, limitations, probable solutions and effects or impacts on interstate relations of this predicament. All these factors will be integrated into the fabric of this migration issue. By doing so, the question of where have they gone, in the context of their literal journey and the physical challenges associated with it, and in light of the developments and measures that have been undertaken to respond to this issue will be answered pertinently.
Delimitation, Scope, and Approach
While the paper generally presents an overview of the internal displacement crisis, it nonetheless narrows down to one particular cause-dimension only which is those generated by conflicts and internal violence. Such causes are the most common and apparent relative to the other causes such as political repressions, cultural, ethnic and religious rivalries and gaps, and natural disasters. The author of this paper aims to present via the cases used herein a partial and first round look on the reasons and causes behind intrastate conflicts and violence and the severity of the effects brought about by these actions. By doing so, this study, therefore also attempts to give the reader a wider view of the other windows of causes of the global crisis.
Given the problems brought about by internal conflicts and the linking factors associated with it, the next question is how the international community would respond to a naturally domestic problem. This brings the dilemma of national sovereignty versus external participation vis-à-vis human rights violations and the responsibilities of governments to respond to its population. This study attempts to present an analysis of such dilemma.
By nature, the problem of internal displacement is a national issue. It is assumed that such problem will be handled “independently” insofar the government of the internally displaced can handle the increasing incidences of internal displacement. However, due to the significant number and correlated problems of internal displacement occurring within certain regions, it has also become a regional crisis as well. In the same way, collectively, it may be considered an international crisis given the significant number of internally displaced persons around the world. Indeed, although this phenomenon is naturally a national or domestic problem, its impact and effects have troubled the international community and even pose threat to neighboring states due to the possibility of refugee incidence if the problem will not be tamed sooner. It’s impact on interstate relations associated with the issues of national sovereignty versus external participation, human rights violations versus humanitarian intervention and others simply makes it an interesting topic in geopolitics. Although the paper may depart slightly from the major points to be presented in this paper, the approach nonetheless would generally be in light of geopolitics.
Review of Related Literature
Presumably, relative to other international issues, the crisis of internal displacement is not so familiar to most countries. Ironically, even if it has already been considered a global crisis, the term internal displacement does not really ring a bell to many citizens of the world especially those whose countries enjoy a high quality of living. The problem of internal displacement to them seemed covered by other “more important” and relevant national issues that have direct impact to them politically, socially and economically. Even in countries where there are relatively less cases of internal displacement, this socio-political dilemma is usually left unnoticed, unpopular and really unfamiliar to common folks living in places miles away from the midpoints of conflict.
It is therefore the well-educated thinkers’ responsibility to slash the weeds of alienation to a certain problem challenging a larger uninformed mass. Hence, the bizarre issue of internal displacement has been continually studied and given attention by researchers and policymakers alike and bring it to the knowledge of the people.
Most of the literature that were used for this study had been taken from published books available in the library. As the issue is not as salient and popular as other more familiar topics in international studies, only a few books about it have been used yet prolifically. The scarcity of published data has not become a hindrance in having a rich research for an online jungle offers scholars’ trails about the said topic. The most credible studies by equally credible authors and monitoring centers, however, have been considered above other data available online. This strategy for research has been undertaken to ensure an updated study of the topic. The most recent book used in this study, for instance, was published in 2004. Others were published in 1993 and 1998. It is but appropriate to rely on an updated monitoring available online. There are also very interesting stories and neo-perspectives from international authors and very reliable international organization sites catering to issues on refugees and internally displaced persons that may be drawn from the internet.
Prior to the initial recognition of the internal displacement predicament, the focus of attention was set on those displaced outside their respective countries. Laws, agreements and institutions were all consolidated into a complex network designed to protect those persons seeking asylum on the territory of a foreign land. They had been tagged refugees who are practically people seeking refuge. As the need for humanitarian action arose, the essential task of establishing an international body for the protection and assistance of refugees also began. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was put up in 1951 and a UN convention was adopted for the same purpose of protecting and assisting people forced out of their homes for various reasons. In the years that followed, there had been a broadening of the refugee concept. It progressively continued until the concern for the internally displaced and its differences from the refugees had been brought to the agenda of policymakers via the significant persistence of the enthusiasts of the said matter.
In the early 1990s, organizations engaged with the issue of internal displacement began to draw attention to the fact that no document specific to internally displaced persons exists. Given this problem, an initial study of the then “new phenomenon” would require immense time and research to come up with a set of guiding principles on internally displaced persons. The Representative of the Secretary General, Francis Deng, was then requested by governments in the UN Commission on Human Rights to study if any existing international law addresses the needs of internally displaced persons as to develop an appropriate normative framework. In the course of the study, Deng examined human rights law and other relevant humanitarian law (which is actually applicable in situations of armed conflict) and refugee laws. He found that although considerable protection in existing international law for internally displaced persons exists, it was still necessary to fuse all the relevant provisions to address the blurry areas identified in the said law. He persevered on searching for other legal standards, mechanisms for enforcement, and other apt measures to improve the situation of the internally trapped.
In 1993, Deng submitted to the UN Commission his report on the given task. Also that year, he published his book, Protecting the Dispossessed, A Challenge for the International Community. It reviews the state of the law and mechanisms of enforcement as well as the situation in the countries he visited where cases of internal displacement had become a prevalent problem. It also presents an analysis of internal displacement as an aspect of a wider crisis of nation building. Lastly, it offers recommendations about what the international community can do to address not only the symptoms represented by internal displacement but also the causes in the domestic conditions.
Francis Deng may be considered an expert on internal displacement given his prolific studies on the said topic. The idea for his studies emerged from his discussions with various groups which are also deeply concerned with the idea of giving this topic enough attention and consideration for publication. Together with The Brookings Institution in collaboration with the Refugee Policy Group and another scholar in the field, Roberta Cohen, two studies have been conducted in pursuit of the concerned scientists’ project: the overview volume, Masses in Flight: The Global Crisis of Internal Displacement and a volume of case studies, The Forsaken People. The first book is an in-depth examination of the overall problem of internal displacement. The second volume was prepared by leading experts with professional or academic expertise in the fields they discuss. A nice thing about the book is that the authors of the case studies given therein come from diverse backgrounds. It then makes the study multi-disciplinary in approach.
I find it essential to consider a legal perspective and approach of the topic particularly within the framework of human rights as well as the legal protection of the internally displaced persons. The book entitled The International Protection of Internally Displaced Persons written by Catherine Phuong has been a reliable and useful one. It gives an analysis of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement set by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights and the role of the said organization regarding the protection and assistance of the internal displaced persons.
As for the most recent and updated source, figures and quantitative data given by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre may be the best reliable ones to consider. Through its work, the Centre contributes to improving national and international capacities to protect and assist the millions of people around the globe who have been displaced within their own country as a result of conflicts or human rights violations. The Centre’s online IDP database provides comprehensive and frequently updated information and analysis on conflict-induced internal displacement around the globe. It is unique in being the only provider of comprehensive information on all situations of conflict-induced internal displacement worldwide.
The database features some 50 internal displacement profiles, each providing a brief overview, as well as more in-depth information and analysis on the respective IDP situation and its background. Thus, the database enables users to quickly acquire an understanding of IDP situations and their context at whatever level of detail and depth is required.
WHO are the internally displaced?
The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in 1998 agreed on non-binding Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement based on the refugee instruments, which defines internally displaced persons as "persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border."[ii]
The definition above has been the most comprehensive and legally recognized definition accepted by scholars and policymakers. It highlights two main elements: 1) The coercive or otherwise involuntary character of movement and 2) the fact that such movement takes place within national borders. These two distinguishing elements are patterned after the 1992 definition presented in the report of the secretary-general of the United Nations. It identifies the internally displaced people as “persons who have been forced to flee their homes suddenly or unexpectedly in large numbers, as a result of armed conflict, internal strife, systematic violations of human rights or natural or man-made disasters, and who are within the territory of their own country.” This was then the most widely used working definition of internally displaced persons until the settlement of a non-binding definition.[iii]
The 1992 definition overlooks two important factors: the time and the numbers involved. If the term “internally displaced” refers only to those forced to leave their homes “suddenly or unexpectedly,” or “in large numbers,” many serious cases of internal displacement will be excluded. For instance, in Colombia, the displaced only flee in small numbers in order to make themselves less conspicuous. Another case in point can be found in Myanmar and Ethiopia where they were forcibly moved by their respective governments. This makes the definition narrow and thus requires alterations to meet the broad scope of internal displacement.[iv]
For this reason, the concerned scholars’ team sought to refine the working definition to embrace the other cases correlated with the problem. The definition they have arrived at eliminates the requirements relating to time and numbers and explicitly includes persons who have been expelled from or obliged to leave their homes due to impending conflicts and confrontations. It has become the official definition used at the international and regional levels.
However, it should be noted that “internal displacement” is a descriptive term that can be applied to a broad range of situations. Not all such situations will necessarily be of concern to the international community. If the needs of the internally displaced are met effectively by their own governments, the international community need not become involved, unless at the government’s request.[v] This issue of intervention will be further discussed in the latter portions of this paper.
How do IDPs DIFFER from refugees?
Compared with the concept of refugee, the notion and expression of “internally displaced persons” is of more recent usage. Until the late 1980s, there was no such standard term. Early references to internally displaced persons were made through the emergence of the expression “displaced persons”: this formula was first employed in the Sudanese context[vi], and was subsequently developed for the purposes of material assistance in cases where it was impossible to assist refugees only and not other populations in need.[vii]
The UN High Commissioner for Refugees, nonetheless, provides a clear distinction between refugees and internally displaced persons. It stresses that both groups often leave their homes for similar reasons. Civilians are recognized as ‘refugees’ when they cross an international frontier to seek sanctuary in another country. The internally displaced, for whatever reason, remain in their own states. Newly arrived refugees normally receive food, shelter and a place of safety from the host country. They are protected by a well-defined body of international laws and conventions. The UN refugee agency and other humanitarian organizations work within this legal framework to help refugees restart their lives in a new state or eventually return home. The internally displaced often face a more difficult future. They may be trapped in an ongoing internal conflict. The domestic government, which may view the uprooted people as ‘enemies of the state,’ retains ultimate control of their fate.[viii]
This notion stating that “IDPs are individuals forced out from their homes by reasons similar to those of the case of refugees but linger under the jurisdiction of their respective states and within the borders the latter” made the concept of refugee more complex. Scholars have had their arguments on this.
The idea of a legal synthesis between refugees and internally displaced persons has been advanced by Luke Lee.[ix] He suggested the deletion of the border-crossing element in the refugee definition. He argues that the requirement of border-crossing has lost its relevance during the post-Cold War era and should therefore be dropped so that groups concerned may be given the legal capacity to address the problem of internal displacement. Hathaway also lists two other reasons for the exclusion of internally displaced persons from the 1951 Convention in order to untie the knot that blurs the distinction between the two notions.[x] First, states should not address the problem of internal displacement by appropriating the refugee definition in order to include the former because it remains the primary responsibility of the state to protect its own population. Second, it would also make a violation of national sovereignty because clearly, internal displacement, by nature and recognition, is part of the internal affairs of the state.
Given these arguments and deliberations, one distinct feature differentiates refugees and internally displaced persons: the border concept with which the issue of external force penetration into one state’s national sovereignty is heavily argued and from which other human rights contentions come to the fore.
A stark contrast in the reception of international protections explicates the difference between refugees and the internally displaced persons in that while the former enjoys the bulk of protection and assistance via humanitarian activities, the latter is excluded since their own governments were expected to provide for their welfare. This dilemma challenged the international community to respond immediately to the urgency of insistence to grab the hands of the internally trapped. However, since it is recognized that a state’s sovereignty should always be respected by other states, the international community just managed to accept and abide by the “rule.”
WHAT are the CAUSES of displacement?
Although there are various reasons for internal displacement as stated in the Guiding Principles, the most common cases are conflict-induced. From the Philippines’ IDP population of 120,000 to Cyprus’ 210,000 to Colombia’s 1,976,970-3,940,164 to Sudan’s 5 million, figures of the conflict-induced internal displacement are varying (some increase, others decrease but usually constant).[xi] Zooming into the causes of conflict, cases would show that reasons also vary. Some are driven by religious disputes, ethnic divergence, internal strife, and cultural differences that are also aggravated by political tensions between or among groups in a certain society within the state.
Looking at a large scale, this last century phenomenon was due to the Cold War. As the United States and the Soviet Union raced for arms and influence over the globe, it has intensified, to some certain extent, the conflicts that were already prevailing in Asia, Latin America and Africa. In the course of this power struggles, millions had been displaced already because of the insurgencies that also caused a chain effect of other problems. Nevertheless, although the Cold War was blamed as the sparkplug or at least contributor to the occurring conflicts that time, it should be understood and considered that it was not entirely the root cause of the problem.
The US Committee for Refugees considers “conflicts between a government and a minority” to be one of the principal causes of internal displacement. Minorities caught in these situations feel dispossessed and abandoned by the national authorities and seek to reverse power imbalance or gain some form of political and cultural autonomy. They may foment civil war to achieve their goals, while other governments seek to perpetuate control over the group, fearing claims to self-determination and disruption of the state.[xii]
The economic angle of these internal conflicts is due to the imbalance of distribution of power, resources and opportunities to a certain state’s diverse population. This prejudice experienced by the minorities is rooted to the assumption that influential and powerful people in the government and the military, to some extent, manipulate these ethic groups which then radicalizes the latter to retaliate as a response. The said manipulation extends farther than political and military factors only. The economic and socio-cultural factors in fact are the true roots of these frictions between the two opposing sides.
Although the above mentioned primary causes of conflict-induced internal displacement may be considered the most familiar and identified as having the largest contribution to the intensity of the conflicts, there are actually multiple and overlapping reasons explaining displacement. What’s really important in presenting the causes, whether they are surface or root causes, is that it gives one a better understanding of the tensions that lead to displacement and apt ways to address, prevent and resolve the problem.
WHO are the ACTORS and other players in this naturally domestic but internationally-dealt with problem?
WHY is it considered a GLOBAL CRISIS?
Overview of Trends and Numbers
Over-all, there are about 52 countries which IDPs may simply call their “torn homes.” Countries with estimates of at least one million IDPs include Sudan, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Uganda, Iraq, Algeria, and Turkey. There has been a dramatic increase in the numbers of internally displaced persons since the end of the Cold War, with a 50-percent rise in the number of IDPs since 1989. The ebb and flow of conflict has resulted in some new names appearing on the list of countries facing major displacement (including Algeria, Burma, Côte d’Ivoire, DRC, Uganda, and Zimbabwe), increases in already heavily affected countries (especially Sudan, where about 2 million people have been displaced in the Darfur region, Colombia, Iraq, Somalia, and Nepal), and some improvements with the restoration of stability and resettlement of IDPs in others (including Angola, Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Liberia).[xiii]
Africa remains the continent with the highest numbers of people who have been internally displaced due to conflict. This decades-long predicament poses further challenges to the mounds of problems of the black continent such as rough internal politics, hunger, poverty, health and environmental challenges. While some conflict situations, as in Burundi and Uganda, appeared to improve during 2006 with substantial numbers of IDPs beginning or continuing to return home, many other countries have experienced a clear deterioration of their situation, as was the case in the Central African Republic (CAR). Chad has appeared for the first time on the list of displacement-producing countries, with no indication of an imminent improvement of the situation. Sudan and the international community continue to struggle to find solutions in the Darfur region, where violence and human rights abuses continue unabated. Somalia has experienced a very volatile year, marked by drought, floods and conflict and has, in the last days of 2006, plunged back into outright conflict. Many countries, like Rwanda and Kenya, have suffered from conflict-related displacement for years. Such protracted displacement situations, left to fester without any effort at finding a long-term solution, may in themselves harbour the seeds for renewed conflict.[xiv]
Asia ranks next to Africa. It has been been tagged as a “patchwork of displacement.” Although internal displacement is not widespread in the region, it is a serious problem in many of its countries. Altogether, Asia has some 5 million internally displaced persons. Most are located in a patchwork of eight countries in western, central, southern and southeastern Asia, respectively: Lebanon and Iraq; Tajikistan and Afghanistan; India and Sri Lanka; and Myanmar and Cambodia. In East Asia, significant displacement only occurs only in the Philippines.[xv] More than two-thirds of the continent’s 3 million internally displaced people are in south Asia, where violence and human rights abuses have forced hundreds of thousands of people from their homes during 2006. New violence in Sri Lanka, Afghanistan and to a lesser extent in Pakistan displaced upwards of 500,000 people during 2006, although often only temporarily. New displacement in the south-east Asian region – mainly in the Philippines, Burma, and Timor-Leste, where 15 per cent of the total population fled their homes – put the total number of newly displaced in Asia at close to 900,000. For the first time since 2001, the total number of IDPs in the region reached the 3 million mark. In comparison, the number of refugees originating from Asia remained at 2.9 million.[xvi]
*grey-shaded parts are where significant cases of internal displacement can be found
In Europe, where internal displacement situations exist in the Balkans, the Caucasus, Turkey and Cyprus, the number of IDPs has been slowly falling over the past several years. However, during 2006, the number of IDPs remained virtually unchanged at approximately 2.8 million. There were several positive developments with regard to the situation of IDPs in Europe in 2006, although many challenges remain. Some governments demonstrated an increased political will to address the IDP situations in their countries. Turkey and Georgia elaborated national strategies to better the situation of IDPs, while Azerbaijan continued implementing its programme to improve the living and socio-economic conditions of IDPs. However, resolutions to the ongoing conflict in Russia and the protracted crises in Azerbaijan and Georgia have not been reached, and the physical security of returnees therefore cannot be guaranteed. IDPs continue to face poor living conditions in collective centres, especially in south-eastern Europe, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Russia. IDPs also face significant obstacles to return and local integration, such as discrimination, lack of livelihood opportunities, poor infrastructure and segregated education.[xvii]
While most of Latin America’s civil wars have ended, the historical and structural injustices that triggered them and the forced displacements of millions of people remain largely unresolved. In 2006, the IDP situation in the region received little attention from the international community. The conflict in Colombia remains active and has caused the world’s second-largest internal displacement crisis after Sudan. Other countries with conflict-related IDP populations are Guatemala, Mexico, and Peru. In the region, more than 3.8 million of the estimated 4.1 million internally displaced are in Colombia. It is also the only country in Latin America where civilians continue to be forced from their homes as the result of an internal armed conflict. In 2006, more than 200,000 Colombians were compelled to leave their homes because of the conflict.[xviii]
CASE OVERVEWS
The case overviews presented herein are selected on the basis of their significance. I would like to emphasize that the cases presented in this section are not actually case studies but overviews only to give the reader a comparative analysis of each case or story. One case study requires too much data and interviews from internal displacement experts. The problem that the author faced in the course of this study is the limitation of actual experts in the country who can impart actual insights and analyses of the problem.
Nonetheless, the paper simply aims to interrogate the root issue but not fully cover the whole story of internal displacement; it seeks to understand the responses undertaken by the key actors and players in the context of sovereignty, human rights violations and humanitarian actions. Aiming this, a comparative overview of the cases would definitely be helpful and advantageous to the study.
Although there are significant and interesting cases in every continent, only one case of a selected country is used to represent the dominant but not necessarily general cause of displacement in that certain region. For example, cases in Asia are dominantly due to the effects of frictions between government and separatist organizations while the cases in Europe show that displacements usually happen due to ethnic rivalries causing waves of dislocations which also proliferate other causes of conflicts. In Latin America, civil war has been the main cause of significant displacement incidences particularly in Peru, Guatemala and Colombia. Except in the case study of Africa which has become the greatest challenge in the internal displacement problem, all the other cases will be by level of countries representative of the region: Philippines for Asia, Colombia for Latin America and Cyprus for Europe. Since the paper is limited to the conflict-induced displacement only, all the cases are therefore focusing on the conflict dimension of the incidence and putting the other causes only on the peripheral of each story.
Colombia
Continuing Struggle of the Homeless
Internal displacement in Colombia has become the largest in the Americas and second largest in the world. The forty-year old saga due to constant political violence among insurgents and the military has produced over one million IDPs since 1985 and continues to increase.
Looking at Colombia’s predicament should be put in the context of its history and traditional patron-client relations and an exclusionary political system that clashed with modernity not to mention the flux and stagnation problems. It may be the oldest democracy in Latin America but its history of political violence has since then been rampant too. The disparities and inequality among people, disproportional distribution of wealth and opportunities, loss of government legitimacy and other factors added to the gigantic maze of social, economic and political crises in the country and are largely caused by its corrupt culture and traditions.
More than 3.5 million out of the country’s 40 million people have been displaced during the last two decades, according to CODHES, an authoritative non-governmental source. The authorities’ figure is only 1.8 million, mainly because they only started systematic registration of internally displaced people (IDPs) in 2000 and do not recognise the CODHES figures from 1985 to 2000. Almost one million people have been displaced since the government of President Álvaro Uribe took office in 2002, according to both sources, although their figures have started diverging over the past two years; the government figures show around 160,000 people newly displaced in 2005, whereas CODHES recorded more than 300,000 new IDPs. Both figures are in any case indicative of a significant escalation of the conflict since 2002, tremendous suffering, imbedded violence, and social, political and economic exclusion in a deeply fragmented country. Massacres, attacks and intimidation of civilian population by the armed groups, particularly in rural areas continue to be reported. None of the IDPs in Colombia live in camps but there are areas where the majority of the inhabitants are IDPs. Typically, they flee from rural areas to shantytowns around larger towns and struggle to make a living. However, increasing control by paramilitary groups and crime-related violence often force the IDPs to flee again within the urban areas.[xix]
Until recently, the phenomenon of displacement in Colombia was different from that in other countries: internally displaced persons typically moved individually, with their immediate families or in small groups. They frequently relocated in silence to neighboring rural areas and from there to urban centers, often to join relatives or friends originating from the same area. The displaced mingled with the local population, generally the poorest layer of the society, which includes other migrant and displaced persons. They did not wish to be identified and therefore avoided contacting authorities or aid organizations.
Although these patterns of movement are long-standing, concern about the humanitarian dimensions of the problem have sharpened. Since 1992, political violence has increased, and displacement is more frequent and affects larger groups of people. Since 1996, several events of collective forced displacement have demonstrated that the practice continues to be an instrumental part of the government’s counterinsurgency strategy and of the drug traffickers’ and guerilla’s territorial control. In some regions, the violent actors have forced the displaced into neighboring Panama and Venezuela; those two countries have undertaken forcible repatriations, thereby bringing an international dimension to the problem. The plight of the displaced has become another of Colombia’s daily stories of violence.[xx]
Campesinos (peasants), ethnic minorities, women and children are disproportionaly affected by displacement: 85 percent of IDPs are campesinos, 33 percent are indigenous peoples and Afro-Colombians, 58 percent are female, 24 percent of households are female-headed, and 70 percent are under nineteen. As the conflict has spread throughout the country the geographic distribution of internal displacement has increased as well.[xxi] (see table 1)
Table 1
Year Municipalities of Municipalities of
Expulsion Reception
1985-1994 99 134
1998 114 266
The link between the socio-economic and political problems is a very tight knot. The complex problems arising from unequal distribution is very much intertwined with the problem of social strata gaps and this twin problem now overlaps or even aggravates the political violence in the countryside. The overflowing problems motivates the displaced to “simply hide” and associate themselves with the other lower strata population and refuse to identify themselves as to avoid any form of threat from the authorities. Their association with the lower strata which are usually where guerilla groups thrive radicalizes them to resort to violence and in a way, “fight for their rights.”
While the government response to the problem of IDPs remains inadequate and under-resourced, the international humanitarian response has not been commensurate with the scale of the crisis. The UN has sought to promote an inter-agency coordinated response to IDPs with a first Humanitarian Plan of Action (HPA) launched in November 2002. This plan, with a budget of $80 million, however, fell short of raising the expected support. A second plan was developed jointly by the United Nations, members of civil society and the government of Colombia, amounting to around $185 million for 2005. While projects have already started, disagreements about the content of the HPA have risen, as the government has refused to be explicit about the ongoing armed conflict and humanitarian emergency, referring instead to “terrorist violence”; it has also rejected the previously agreed human rights focus of the Plan. The Plan was ultimately launched in early 2005 as a government document, not officially endorsed by the UN.[xxii]
Cyprus
The Longest Standing Internal Displacement Situation In Europe
One-Third of Population, Displaced
Internal displacement seems too depressing as an issue. The numbers are overwhelming and the problems behind the people’s displacement are so complicated; so complex, so knotted, so tightly intertwined, so perplexing, a maze of interconnected predicaments. And even if the states allow humanitarian intervention, would supports and aids suffice the needs of the victims? Good to know, there are some countries whose humanitarian needs are no longer that pressing and troubling. Take the case of Cyprus.
Close to a quarter of the inhabitants of Cyprus – 210,000 ethnic Greek and Turkish Cypriots – have been internally displaced for over 30 years. This constitutes the longest-standing internal displacement situation in Europe. Unlike the vast majority of protracted displacements in the world though, internally displaced people (IDPs) in Cyprus no longer have pressing humanitarian needs. Greek Cypriots have built a new life in southern Cyprus, under the control of the Greek Cypriot government, and so have Turkish Cypriots in the northern part of the island. Nevertheless, displaced Greek Cypriot communities in the South continue to express their strong desire to return and recover their lost properties in the North. In April 2004, a UN-proposed settlement widely supported by the international community was defeated by Greek Cypriot voters in a referendum. As a result, IDPs in both parts of the island continue to be unable to realise their residency and property rights in their areas of origin. The accession of the Greek Cypriot side to the European Union (EU) in May 2004 did not contribute to a rapprochement between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots either. Still, there have been recent positive developments, including the increased freedom of movement between the North and the South of the island, the election of a new leader in the North, and the improvement of relations between the Turkish Cypriot side and the EU.[xxiii]
Thirty years after the Turkish intervention, the United Nations no longer sees the humanitarian situation of the displaced population in Cyprus as a problem, as shown by the removal of the Cypriot IDPs from the list of populations of concern to UNHCR in 1999. The displaced in both parts of the island are considered to have been integrated by the respective authorities. Displaced people in the South have received strong support from the Greek Cypriot government in the form of a comprehensive program of housing and relief. A special IDP status has been granted to the displaced and their children, which gives them access to social and tax benefits. The integration of the displaced in the Greek-controlled area has also been greatly facilitated by successful economic growth since the end of the conflict (Republic of Cyprus, 1999; UNFICYP, 4 January 2001). In the North, the assistance provided by the Turkish Cypriot administration to the displaced has consisted mainly of the allocation of properties left behind by their Greek Cypriot owners.[xxiv]
Philippines
The Question of “Safety and Safeguard” of the Displaced
The case of the Philippines represents the many cases of conflicts between the government and rebel groups in Asia. Heavy fighting and confrontations result to large-scale displacement mainly in the southern island of Mindanao where Muslim separatists have fought since the 1970s. The problem of terrorists thriving within the most secluded jungles of the island and sometimes with the community folks challenged the government to attack these places resulting to the displacement of the natives. The conflict in Mindanao may be rooted to the unequal distribution of resources, regional underdevelopment and insufficiency is rooted in the general underdevelopment of the region, the unequal distribution of wealth, and perhaps the lack of sufficient effort by the central government to integrate the Muslim (or "Moro") minority into the national political and institutional fabric. Although other causes add to the complex situation in Mindanao such as land and property issues, religious, ethnic and cultural differences, the most dominant cause is usually blamed to armed incidents between government forces and the communist rebels.
An estimated 100,000 people were displaced from their homes in the Philippines during 2006 as a result of armed conflict and human right abuses. The fighting and displacement is mainly concentrated in the Muslim-populated areas of central and south-western Mindanao where, in two separate incidents, close to 70,000 people were forced from their homes in Maguindanao province following clashes between Muslim separatist rebels and security forces. In addition to these new displacements, which have been mainly temporary, tens of thousands of people in Mindanao remain unable to return or are living in situations akin to displacement due to previous conflicts. Due to the fluidity of the displacement situation, with frequent clashes and short-term displacement movements, there are no accurate figures available on the total number of internally displaced persons (IDPs). Vulnerable IDPs in the Philippines is at an estimate of 120,000.[xxv]
Between 2000 and 2006, armed conflict in the Philippines caused the displacement of nearly two million people (refer to figure 1). The majority were displaced in Mindanao by two major military operations launched by the government in 2000 and 2003. A ceasefire agreed in July 2003 put an end to the fighting and allowed for the return of most of the displaced, despite conditions that were often not conducive to sustainable reintegration. Since then, improved dialogue and confidence-building measures established between the government and the MILF have prevented sporadic armed skirmishes and army operations against criminal gangs from turning into larger armed confrontations. Also, a Malaysian-led international monitoring team has been deployed in Mindanao since October 2004 and has helped to maintain the ceasefire.[xxvi]
Figure 1
While many IDPs have been able to return in the days or weeks following their displacement and managed to restart their lives with their property, land and means of livelihood left relatively intact, hundreds of thousands of people have not been so lucky. In the wake of the large-scale military offensives of 2000 and 2003, heavy fighting caused widespread destruction of houses and property and forced the displaced into prolonged stays in hastily set-up evacuation camps or with friends and relatives. The majority of those displaced in 2003 had already gone through the same predicament three years before and they were further weakened by renewed displacement. Although the ceasefire agreement signed by the MILF and the government in July 2003 had a clear positive effect on the overall stability of the region and prevented the eruption of large military confrontations, return and reintegration remained elusive for many IDPs. In early 2007, it was estimated that some 20 per cent of the estimated 40,000 people evacuated due to fighting in Maguindanao province had been unable to return to their homes, nearly six months after being initially displaced.[xxvii]
The protection needs of the civilians and displaced population is now the next big challenge that the government must focus on. The government’s counter-rebel operations conducted by the military often resulted to human rights abuses against civilians suspected of belonging or supporting the rebels. According to a UNICEF study covering the period 2001-2005, the military strategy of the armed forces during counter-insurgency operations against the NPA has tended to explicitly disregard the distinction between combatants and civilians. Even more alarming, the official military strategy against terrorism appeared to consider anyone suspected of associating with terrorists as legitimate military targets.[xxviii]
Under-development and the destruction caused by years of fighting have further impoverished an already disadvantaged population, with the displaced particularly vulnerable to food insecurity, health risks and unemployment. The needs of IDPs are generally addressed as part of wider development and rehabilitation programmes conducted by the government in partnership with the United Nations and donor countries and institutions. Sporadic skirmishes between the government forces and the MILF rebels and territorial issues have continued to block the signing of a peace agreement during 2006, while also obstructing the implementation of programmes aimed at rehabilitating and developing the conflict-affected areas of Mindanao. Focusing largely on a developmental approach, the international aid community needs to pay more attention to protection and human rights issues, which are particularly at risk in the context of the government’s “war on terror”.[xxix]
Africa
The Biggest Challenge
More than half of the 25 million of the internally displaced population are from Africa. Perhaps, all the problems cited in the previous cases also exist in Africa. But what sets the African kind of predicament is its vast and massive stage of simultaneous existence of conflicts resulting to internal displacement. If in Latin America as embodied in the case of Colombia, the main cause of internal displacement is blamed to political violence between military and guerilla groups sprouting mainly from land issues; if in Europe, as signified by the case of Cyprus, the main cause of conflict is ethnic rivalries; and if in Asia, represented by the case of the Philippines, it is predominantly due to government and separatist/rebel groups’ frictions; the African experience makes up the complete portrait of all these problems. Indeed, the situation in Africa depicts a sad story -- a picture of dead men and women and children in tears, one about hopelessness.
Ending conflict-displacement on the African continent is essentially dependent on finding political solutions and engaging in meaningful peace and reconciliation processes. While the bulk of the political will to end violence must come from within the individual countries, the international community as a whole plays an important role – facilitating peace processes and aiding in the reconstruction of infrastructure. Fulfilling this role is very difficult in the complex and historically charged African context, where interests other than the humanitarian tend to maintain the upper hand. As a result, international humanitarian aid often remains ad hoc and short term. Initiatives such as the UN cluster approach, which is being piloted in Africa, and the Peace Building Commission’s work in Burundi, aim to provide more predictable and long-term aid to countries in conflict and to assist in the always-fragile transition from conflict to peace.
CRITICAL ANALYSES AND ARGUMENTS
The primary concerns of the paper, with the help of overviews of the internal displacement predicament and the cases, are to analyze the (human) rights sustained o denied, (state and international organization) protection given and (humanitarian) assistance provided to the considerably most vulnerable population of conflict-stagnated states; to examine the dilemma with regard to state sovereignty versus external intervention using the lens of different experts; and lastly, to present the responses that the international community has undertaken to attend immediately and appropriately to the global crisis of displacement.
The first concern will be expounded by presenting and analyzing the provisions cited in the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement drafted and submitted to the Commission on Human Rights in March 1998 by the leading legal experts in humanitarian law. Initializing on this analysis, the first concern will also be expounded by answering the following questions: a.) what are the guiding principles set by the United Nations? b.) what rights do internally displaced persons have? How are these rights denied of them?; and c.) what particular challenges do internally displaced persons face in these selected countries?
The second concern, as it seeks to figure out the tight spot regarding sovereignty and intervention, will be developed by initially presenting the argument involving the responsibility (whose responsibility) and accountability of national and international constituencies. Unlocking or at least attempting to sum up points by comparison would help one to give a stand if it is really justifiable for external forces to thoroughly intervene without barriers or just back off and stay at bay hoping for the state government of the internally displaced persons to respond to its displaced population. If the latter would be the case, doesn’t it plainly imply abandonment of human rights by arguing that states are not immediately attending to the needs of its citizens; or does it mean that involved governments are just protecting their sovereignty or having any other logical grounds, so they fence out forces or even aids.
In some cases, there had been external intervention where supports by forms of largely health assistance are given. Actually, even if the decision to intervene is taken, the problem is not yet over, but simply moves on to further advance the scale of intervention essential to solve the problem. But while the issue of intervention is not yet fully terminated, concrete responses have already been undertaken by some involved states and the international community as a whole to lessen and prevent further cases of displacement. These responses will be provided in the last portion of the paper.
D. Whose responsibility is it to protect and assist internally displaced persons? Do their efforts suffice? And in some rare cases, what has been the significant role of national governments in the forced displacement of its civilians?
UNHCR's mandate is to protect refugees – people who cannot rely on the protection of their own government, and who have crossed an international border in the process of fleeing persecution, war or human rights abuse. Many other people are also forced to flee these dangers, but they either cannot or do not wish to cross an international border. They are internally displaced within the borders of their own country. Legally, they fall under the sovereignty of their own government, even though that government may not be able or willing to protect them.
In recent years, because of its expertise with emergency mass movements of people, UNHCR has been involved in programs for internally displaced people as well as for refugees. The agency can only act to help these people at the request of the U.N. Secretary General or a competent principal organ of the United Nations, and with the consent of the government of the country involved.
It is difficult to determine the number of people living in interior exile within their own country. Estimates usually place them at least 30 million. Today, of the 22.4 million people presently under UNHCR responsibility worldwide, nearly 6 million are internally displaced.
E. Up to what extent must the external forces limit themselves from intervening through these
“domestic” problems?
F. Are they really forgotten?
G. What are the probable solutions to the problem of internal displacement?
http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?ID=2744
H. What are the effects of internal displacement phenomena on interstate relations?
The trap into which the internally displaced have fallen and are continuously struggling to get out from has almost become a quagmire pulling them to an everyday life of pain, despondency, and rejection. They seem left behind doors of hope and development. When will their seemingly perennial journey in grief stop? I believe that one day their hundred-mile calvary of sorrow and rejection will end. That place which they call their land, but has never been home at all, will one day be seen as but a memory of the past.
[i] I borrowed the term “orphans of conflict” from Donald Steinberg in his article “Orphans of Conflict: Caring for the Internally Displaced.”
[ii] The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, http://www.unhchr.ch
[iii] Cohen, Roberta and F. Deng. Masses in Flight: The Global Crisis of Internal Displacement. (Washington DC:
Brookings Institutions Press, 1998), 16.
[iv] Ibid, 17.
[v] Ibid, 18.
[vi] See GA Res. 2958 (XXVIII), December 12, 1972
[vii] See Hartling, “The Concept and Definition of “Refugee” –Legal and Humanitarian Aspects” (1979) 48 Nordisk Tidsskrift for International Ret 125.
[viii] Internally Displaced People: Questions and Answers. UN High Commissioner on Refugees, http://www.unhcr.org
[ix] See Lee’s Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees: Toward a Legal Synthesis? in Journal of Refugee Studies (Oxford University Press, 1996).
The number of internally displaced persons now exceeds that of refugees. Although both categories of people are coerced or compelled to flee their homelands in fear for life, liberty and security, only refugees are entitled to systematic international protection and assistance under existing international treaties and instruments, which require the crossing of international borders as a prerequisite. This despite the fact that internally displaced persons often suffer more than refugees. Such a prerequisite may be challenged on historical, practical, juridical and human rights grounds, whose validity is examined in this paper. The paper concludes with a strong plea for reconsidering the use of the crossing of international borders as a prerequisite to systematic international protection and assistance of people forcibly displaced from their homes.
[x] See Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status (Toronto: Butterworths, 1991)
[xi] Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, http://www.internal-displacement.org
[xii] Op cit, Cohen and Deng, 21.
[xiii] Steinberg, David. “Orphans of Conflict: Caring for the Internally Displaced” in Special Report. United States Inst. For Peace, 2005.
[xiv] Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, http://www.internal-displacement.org
[xv] Op cit, Cohen and Deng, 56.
[xvi] Ibid.
[xvii] Ibid.
[xviii] Ibid.
[xix] Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, http://www.internal-displacement.org
[xx] Cohen, Roberta and F. Deng. The Forsaken: Case Studies of the Internally Displaced. (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1998), 401.
[xxi] Nioole, Amber. The Protection of Colombia’s Internally Displaced Population. http://www.ucalgary.ca
[xxii] Special report by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center regarding the international humanitarian response addressing the problem of displacement in Colombia
[xxiii] Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
[xxiv] UNHCR, 11 January 2001; UNFICYP, 4 January 2001; ECHR, 10 May 2001, Case of Cyprus
[xxv] Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
[xxvi] Ibid.
[xxvii] Oxfam G-B, 24 January 2007 and IDMC
[xxviii] United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), Uncounted Lives: Children, Women and Conflict in the Philippines. (October 2006), 35-36
[xxix] Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Norwegian Council
Saturday, 8 September 2007
Wednesday, 29 August 2007
Friday, 17 August 2007
WHEN TERRORISTS GO NUCLEAR
Threat, Securitization and Responses
Aaron Grajo Laylo
In November 2001, as U.S. warplanes flew over Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden told a nerve-racking statement to Pakistani journalist Hamid Mira, “Al Qaeda had access to nuclear weapons and would not hesitate to use them for "self-defense."
Days are already dangerous and getting even more dangerous as dissenters make use of the latest and highly-developed machineries, tools and equipment in technology to frighten people and pressure governments to the extent of spurring discord within the latter. Eventually, referent objects, being the constant target of terrorist attacks and after being choked by threats, may get destabilized in the absence of pertinent security measures.
For years, strategic placement of cities and borders along coasts or natural barriers, the use of wall defenses, mighty armadas and trenches and tight ethno-religious groupings have been used as security strategies by nations to safeguard their territories from the foes’ invasion and other threats that may destabilize their society or even wipe out their civilization. The advent of the 20th century has seen airplanes, submarines, ballistic missiles, and weapons of mass destruction as new-fangled approaches to security. Since then, continuous innovations and revolutions have been made to satisfy standards of security. With this contemporary equipments and supplies, borders have become increasingly leaky thus the possibilities of breaking into the referent object’s realm. Consequently, destruction may just be seconds away to the very doorstep of territories on a scale previously not envisioned.
So to speak, we are living in a so called “borderless world.” This implies the continuing trend of globalization. This is the forcing factor that changes the international security landscape in a very drastic manner that it has compelled a fundamental reevaluation of security strategies. The global community has become interdependent, with the constant movement of people, ideas and goods. Migration, information, technology, ideas, goods and almost everything transferable are done conveniently. Given this fact, that we are in a borderless world, the threats that we face also have no borders and they continue to increase and break into every part of the globe. Endeavors are much more difficult to combat now and just as they are complex, the approaches should also be complex.
Perhaps, the toughest endeavor and threat that the international community is facing right now is terrorism. The recent significant terrorist attacks have put the issue of terrorism in a salient position where it is right now. Moreover, the threat of the use of nuclear terrorism likewise tends to make it even more worth the attention or limelight status on international peace and security.
The Seminar Paper
This paper will focus on Nuclear Terrorism’s threat to security particularly the menacing of terrorists to the international community on the acquisition, formulation, and use of nuclear weapons and devices as well as attacking or sabotaging their targets using stolen materials for the sinister purpose of mass destruction.
The primary concern of the paper is the securitization of nuclear terrorism and in doing this, I considered to divide it into three very important questions to dissect the larger remainder of the paper: first, why securitize it; second, how was it securitized; and third, what else can be done after such securitization to sustain the already laid down measures. But a short assessment of the security-terrorism nexus is definitely significant. It is considered in this paper.
Credible studies and analysis by scholars on global security and nuclear proliferation as well as organizations and groups inclined to the study of nuclear risks and counter-measures have been used lucratively as these are certainly important and helpful as a jumping ground for the seminar paper.
Accordingly, the questions of who are the securitizing actors, what is the referent object, what is the existential threat (because of which an issue has to be securitized; it is also the direct answer to why an issue is securitized) and how can it be securitize (what measures are not just available but more importantly, the most appropriate) will all be integrated into the three major questions supporting the primary concern of the paper: the securitization of the threat of nuclear terrorism.
Before fully gliding onto the nuclear terrorism threat proper of this paper, it is essential to primarily consider the arguments and other dimensions linking terrorism and security.
Terrorism and Security
Terrorism, in its real sense, has been existing since time immemorial but it was just in the most recent centuries when terrorism had become international community’s foremost opponent and its escalating threat has, for years, sort of “pressurized” the international audience and compel the authorities (practically, independent states) to ally their capacities to crash the terrors of today.
The strategy for terrorism has already been so apparent given countless incidents in almost all parts of the globe: it is the desperate attempt of a certain group to pressure its addressee (authority or government, including the population) and convince them to agree to their demands as to avoid future or further harms to the latter. Eventually, that existing government would get destabilized, a disgruntled population would the join an uprising by the threatening group thus the escalation of the conflict. Basing on historical events in the past, the common grounds of disputes are the following: secession of a territory to form a new sovereign state; dominance of territory or resources by various ethnic groups; imposition of a particular form of government, such as democracy, theocracy, or anarchy; economic deprivation of a population; and opposition to a domestic government or occupying army. Thirst for attention, pursuit for change, and expression of grievances are therefore the primary factors of their rebellious undertakings.
Kydd and Walter, in their article Strategies of Terrorism posited that terrorism is designed to change minds by destroying bodies. This may be interpreted as influencing people to sympathize with them in their goals but in making it possible, so many lives were negatively affected by their actions (destroying bodies) and worse, long term psychological effects or traumas to the victims. In their perspective of terrorism, they also considered that it is a form of costly signaling and employs five primary strategies of this: attrition, intimidation, provocation, spoiling, and outbidding. In an attrition strategy, terrorists seek to persuade the enemy that the terrorists are strong enough to impose considerable costs if the enemy continues a particular policy. Terrorists using intimidation try to convince the population that the terrorists are strong enough to punish disobedience and that the government is too weak to stop them, so that people behave as the terrorists wish. A provocation strategy is an attempt to induce the enemy to respond to terrorism with indiscriminate violence, which radicalizes the population and moves them to support the terrorists. Spoilers attack in an effort to persuade the enemy that moderates on the terrorists’ side are weak and untrustworthy, thus undermining attempts to reach a peace settlement. Groups engaged in outbidding use violence to convince the public that the terrorists have greater resolve to fight the enemy than rival groups, and therefore are worthy of support. Understanding these five distinct strategic logics is crucial not only for understanding terrorism but also for designing effective antiterrorism policies.[i]
Accordingly, the strategies being undertaken by the terrorists wish to signal that the latter have the capacity to impose costs on those who oppose them (their target, practically, the government and the population). However, the authors are also keen to the fact that each strategy works well under certain conditions only and poorly under others. Also, state responses to one strategy may be inappropriate for others.
Various measures have already been done to crash down terrorism but most governments are not that keen, sensitive or cautious if the suspicion followed by initial actions is reasonable. What must be behind the targeted group’s “terrorist” action? One dilemma that will emerge here is this: which side is really on the right position to say that their actions are reasonable, the State and the civilians which would argue that their security is the one that is more threatened by violent actions that would not only destabilize it (in the case of the State/ government) or injure them but worse, kill their loved ones (in the case of the civilians); OR is it the group who, because of fury and aggression, went to pressure the former so that it could have proportional rights or at least proper treatment from the State? They would also argue that they are more insecure because of the denial of their rights to decent living and other services that are supposedly to be provided by the government. It is actually not just concrete supplies and services that they are asking for but also proportional rights in terms of status as a minority or that feeling of being prejudiced.
Perhaps, one can attest to a more just image of the government and a negative image of the terrorists. On the other hand, one could strongly argue that it is the discriminated and/or unsatisfied people-turned-terrorists that should be considered more prone to other threats like incessant violence, disease and hunger in their far-flung and almost rejected places. This has become a dilemma to many contemporary scholars. It is very likely that “nagatungan” biases would further escalate debates on this issue.
To put it in a simpler way, the question here is “whose security should really be considered?”
This above-mentioned query was also asked by Brabazon but the approach was in light of the impacts of anti-terrorism legislations on civil liberties. After the 911 attack, most of the policies that were made aimed to further strengthen the capacity of the State to protect definite interests. Since then, a growing body of literature has developed examining the impact of anti-terrorism legislation on civil liberties, but very little addresses the impact of the legislation specifically on social movements or on dissent to the current configuration of power in their society more generally.[ii] Furthermore, his paper gives the reader preliminary analysis of the impact and potential impact of anti-terrorism legislation on social movements focusing on the possible political rationale behind such impacts. As Brabazon strongly asserted, the policies are designed directly or indirectly to protect the dominant economic project by criminalizing the social movements and community organizing that threatens it – in short, to criminalize dissent.
The wide array of literature (arguments, hypotheses, debates and dilemmas) about terrorism is indeed multi-dimensional. The questions raised are just portions of the evolving views, broadening dimensions and rising contentions on the terrorism-security knot. In the next portions of the paper, nonetheless, these questions may still and also be relevant. The focus of the paper would be the much more obvious but similarly important dimension of the many threats and security issues in relation to terrorism.
From “Mere” Terrorism to Nuclear Terrorism
When asked to picture a terrorist scenario, one would already think of suicide bombings in urban centers and major cities of the globe, exploding buses and trains, anthrax scare and other dissemination of toxic materials, harsh hostage scenarios and violent confrontations by the military and the terrorist groups.
In September 2001, there was the World Trade Center attack. On the same day, the “invincible” Pentagon was also attacked. Just few weeks after these incidents, was the sudden anthrax scare. Since then, the American nightmare has become much more imaginable not only to the Americans themselves but to the global community too. That was the beginning of the so-called (Global) War on Terrorism.
Prior to that, there had already been other relatively “minor” terrorist attacks in the Asia-Pacific region particularly in the Philippines by the Abu Sayyaf; ETA and IRA attacks in Europe particularly in Madrid and London, HAMAS attacks in the Middle East and so on. Subsequent to the famous 911 event, the attacks were already perceived as the terrorist network’s series of terror activities. The 911 became a benchmark event and the Al Qaeda terrorist group eventually became an internationally recognized but despised terrorist organization led by Bin Laden. In the course of that very recent and still vivid portion of modern history, the issue on religion-rooted and state-sponsored terrorism also escalated as well as an exaggerated discrimination to Arab-looking people and all those that have Arab-sounding names.
The intimidating menaces of the terrorist network are indeed seriously threatening to and crucial in international peace and security. What more if they go nuclear?
The war now is not actually between or among states. It is indeed a war on terrorism and the threat is worse: WHEN TERRORISTS GO NUCLEAR (Can terrorists really use nuclear weapons as their “newest” menacing thing? How big is the threat?)
The threat of nuclear terrorism is big.
It is very threatening. (emphasis)
The proliferation of nuclear weapons or radiological dispersal devices to terrorist groups can be considered as the gravest of all terrorist threats facing the international community especially the US which is at the forefront of major attacks. The possibility of terrorists constructing or obtaining a nuclear weapon and detonating it in a city is already recognized by many scholars, scientists, and policy-makers alike.
Nuclear materials, technologies and know-how are more widely available today than ever before. Small quantities of both fissile materials and highly radioactive materials, sufficient to manufacture a radiological dispersal device, are actively traded on the black market. Although terrorist groups are not suspected of actually acquiring such materials in large quantities, it is difficult to know for sure. A nuclear detonation by a terrorist group would likely result in an unprecedented number of casualties. In contrast, a radiological dispersal attack would probably be less violent, but could significantly contaminate an urban center, causing economic and social disruption. Also, both types of attacks would have significant psychological impacts on the entire population.[iii]
Why Securitize Nuclear Terrorism?
The outright answer for this is simply because it is a very obvious existential threat to the State. Terrorism itself is already a threat. What more if the way of executing such violence would be by the use of nuclear weapons, or the initial threat of the possibilities that these hazardous materials are in the hands of the terrorists and at any point of conflict, the dirty bomb would just exploded.
There are three major potential nuclear security threats: the acquisition of nuclear weapons by theft; the creation of nuclear explosive devices using stolen nuclear materials; and the use of these weapons. All these are possible actions that can be undertaken by terrorists posing a greater threat to security. Unlike during the Cold War when US and USSR (as the leading nuclear states) together with the others (France, Britain and China) are the only possible source of tension and fear for the international community, the threat is greater in that there are big possibilities of acquiring, building and using (and use for attack) these radioactive materials and nuclear weapons irresponsibly in the hands of terrorists. Adding to the already big threat are also the possibilities that Iran and North Korea Korea’s state sponsorship would also create greater tension not only to the most vulnerable of attacks but also to the international community.
Acquisition
Terrorists can acquire nuclear weapons by theft, procurement or manufacturing. Manufacturing cannot be done of there are no materials to use. Therefore, the primary concern is: where can they get these materials?
Roughly 30,000 nuclear weapons exist worldwide. Several hundred weapons are vulnerable to theft by terrorists or criminals who might sell them to terrorist organizations. It is clear that some such groups are interested in acquiring a nuclear device:
It seems improbable that a state would deliberately provide a nuclear weapon to a terrorist group unless it is a state-sponsored case. Fear of retribution from the attacked state and international community, potential loss of control over the nuclear-armed terrorist group, and a reluctance to surrender nuclear weapons to another party due to the intrinsic difficulty of acquiring them all mitigate against such state sponsorship.[iv]
Still, the United States and Russia maintain the world's largest nuclear stockpiles. While many nuclear weapons in Russia are adequately protected from theft, others are not. Many Soviet-era tactical nuclear devices are especially vulnerable, and given the smaller size of such weapons, would be particularly suitable for use by terrorists. The demise of the U.S.S.R. left the security of such materials in doubt, but as yet there is no evidence that any has fallen into the wrong hands.
Regarding the possibility of the Al Qaeda terrorists in acquiring materials, Dr. Gary Samore of the International Institute for Strategic Studies said "In the decade since the collapse of the Soviet Union, there is no documented case that we know of where a substantial quantity of weapons-grade material was offered for sale on the black market. As far as we know, no one has been able to acquire a substantial quantity of the material—much less create a weapon itself. Of course, one has to allow for the possibility that it's happened and we don't know about it, but so far it seems to be a horrible scenario that hasn't yet taken place."[v]
Another state that is seen as a possible source and manufacturing state is Pakistan. It is thought to have some 30-50 nuclear weapons, based on a stockpile of some 600-800 kilograms of HEU.[vi] Pakistan is now also producing weapons plutonium, but the amount produced to date is believed to be small, only enough for a handful of additional nuclear weapons.[vii]
A significant segment of Pakistani society holds extreme Islamic views and is sympathetic to the Taliban and al Qaeda. This includes some insiders within Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, as demonstrated by the case of Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, a former head of Pakistan's plutonium production who strongly supported the Taliban, met with Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan, and was placed under house arrest for a time on suspicion of passing nuclear secrets to bin Laden.[viii] The possibility that insiders would attempt to steal a nuclear weapon or nuclear material to make one, or to pass secrets on nuclear weapons design and assembly, is real. Hence, effective measures to address insider threats must be put in place at Pakistani nuclear weapons and nuclear material facilities.
Of where they can really acquire materials to use is still a puzzle. However, even if they can acquire, the next step is still difficult.
Building Weapons
The first question of building nuclear weapons by terrorists has already been addressed by many governments and by nongovernmental groups. Nuclear materials, technologies and know-how are more widely available today than ever before. Small quantities of fissile materials are actively traded on the black market. Although terrorist groups are not known to currently possess fissile materials in sufficient quantities to make nuclear explosives, they are known to have made attempts to acquire fissile materials.[ix]
The ability of a terrorist group to weaponize the fissile material into a nuclear weapon is difficult to assess. Even without direct state support, a well-funded, technically competent terrorist group could assemble the necessary skills and facilities to weaponize fissile material. Terrorist groups that are safely established within states would have a far easier time in researching and developing nuclear weapons, whether or not the state provided direct assistance to their nuclear efforts. Without the opportunity to work uninterrupted for a significant period of time, a terrorist group may find the task beyond its reach. If the terrorist group succeeded in obtaining fissile material, it would then be in the position to rapidly make a nuclear weapon.[x]
Use of Nuclear Weapons
The question about whether terrorists would use nuclear weapons is much more difficult to assess. Opinions on terrorism, however, are changing. In the past, analysts have regarded nuclear terrorism as unlikely, given the likely international backlash against such an attack. But now, a new breed of terrorists, motivated by religious rather than political goals, seem less concerned with the consequences of creating large numbers of casualties. Such groups might use nuclear weapons if given the chance.
Into Securitization
Given these concrete threats, we can already say that terrorism should definitely be securitized. But looking further, using the Copenhagen notion of securitization, what propelled the further securitization of terrorism from already a considered above politics issue? The notion simply puts it this way: securitization is the “move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics.”
I would like to put an emphasis on the fact that terrorism has already been considered an above politics issue even before the tragic 911 attacks. Since the dawn of the twentieth century, terrorism had already become a salient issue especially in conflict-ridden countries. The only distinct factor is that after 911, all the states’ independent treatment (national level security measures) of the issue as one that is above politics issue were all consolidated and integrated into the very fabric of a global war on terrorism (international level). Meaning, what really drove the states’ engine of politicization to a more intense level was the need for an allied, or perhaps a better term is interdependent, actions that would pursue policies and establish appropriate measures that could meet the real urgency of securitizing the issue of terrorism.
Interestingly, because of that rapid soar of the securitization of terrorism, it was not considered to be treated at all in a regional level. It was accelerated to an international level at once. This is because of the clear fact that although terrorism primarily thrives in independent conflict-ridden states, the effect of globalization has become an essential tool that even terrorists have had a network. This also brings us to the reality that terrorism cannot really be solved without international cooperation because after all, terrorism has become an international problem. (emphasis)
So why is there a need to put nuclear terrorism in an above-politics level? Any form of terrorism is simply terrorism itself. No matter what form it is, it is still that violent activity that should be toppled down immediately. Actually, the Global War on Terrorism by the US does not specifically pinpoint which form of terrorism should be knocked down first. That’s the very reason why it was called an all-out war on terrorism, meaning, there is a certain goal of completely obliterating terrorism from the face of the earth (not being pessimistic, but realistically speaking, that’s like reaching the moon in a day). Therefore, it doesn’t really matter if the threat is nuclear, chemical, biological, traditional weapons or other forms when realizing securitization of terrorism. At the end of the day, we still call all these forms of violence as terrorist activities.
There are immediate oppositions to this argument. One can say that there should always be a hierarchy of priorities insofar threat is concerned. Narrowing down to terrorism, an argument that may arise is that there are really weapons that are more dangerous and threatening compared with other weapons or forms of terrorism. Exploding a bus or mini-store is different from exploding a whole city. The case of Madrid bombings is different from the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings. Different levels and approaches should then be supplied. This line is argument is much more favorable and would put nuclear terrorism at the foremost concern in securitizing terrorism and other actions.
How was it securitized?
Considering first the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation, the most significant action providing this is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) of . It remains the global anchor for disarmament too. Although there are flaws in the system, its implementation continues to provide security benefits by proving assurance that nuclear energy is not misused for weapon purposes. Weapons can be advanced by nuclear technologies but responsible management of it is an imperative step. Although this said treaty is sometimes perceived as project of the industrialized states, it benefits as well other “weaker” states.
Although various efforts had already been done prior to and following the 911 to combat terrorism, it was just in 2005 that the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism was adopted by the United Nations.
The idea for a treaty on the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism originated in the 1990s in the wake of growing concerns about the threat of terrorists using nuclear or radiological material. Worries about terrorists gaining access to nuclear materials date back to earlier periods, as illustrated by the adoption in 1980 of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.[xi] The post-Cold War surge of fears about terrorism generally and, more specifically, terrorism involving biological, chemical, nuclear, or radiological agents led to the establishment by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in December 1996 of an Ad Hoc Committee mandated “to elaborate an international convention for the suppression of terrorist bombings and, subsequently, an international convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism, to supplement related existing international instruments, and thereafter to address means of further developing a comprehensive legal framework of conventions dealing with international terrorism[.]”[xii]
Since its establishment, the Ad Hoc Committee has produced three treaties that the UN General Assembly adopted and that have entered into force: the International Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (adopted in 1997; entered into force in 2001);[xiii] the International Convention on the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism (adopted in 1999; entered into force in 2002);[xiv] and the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (Convention) (adopted in 2005; entered into force in 2007).[xv] The Convention represents, therefore, the first anti-terrorism treaty adopted after September 11, 2001. Despite the relevance of many international legal instruments to nuclear terrorism, the UN General Assembly and the Ad Hoc Committee created the Convention because “existing multilateral legal provisions do not adequately address those attacks[.]”[xvi]
The Convention aims to address the unlawful possession or use of nuclear devices or materials by non-state actors. It calls for states to develop appropriate legal frameworks criminalizing nuclear terrorism-related offenses, investigate alleged offenses, and, as appropriate, arrest, prosecute, or extradite offenders. It also calls for international cooperation with nuclear terrorism investigations and prosecutions, through information-sharing, extradition and the transfer of detainees to assist with foreign investigations and prosecutions.[xvii]
The Nuclear Terrorism Convention speaks to values and themes articulated to varying degrees in the past by the United States and its allies. The following are the most important themes insofar combating terrorism by international cooperation is concerned:
a. outlawing and condemning terrorist activities
b. demonstrating global unity in opposition to terrorism
c. treating terrorism as a matter subject to domestic and international law
d. challenging states to use, and if necessary adapt, their domestic legal systems to combat terrorism
e. looking to states to cooperate as sovereign partners in the fight against terrorism, doing so within the context of domestic legal actions, as well as through related international mechanisms such as sovereign-to-sovereign extradition (but, as mentioned above, not by utilizing a free-standing international bureaucracy like the ICC, differences over which have contributed to Transatlantic friction)
f. using the United Nations as an international forum to develop inter-state cooperation, as a gathering place for sovereign partners
g. using international law as a basis and framework for action, and using the United Nations as a forum for developing international law
As can be seen, these themes touch on values held, for example, by both Europe and the United States. It gives security a high priority; grounds security in law, including international law; is UN-centered; and is sovereignty-based, calling for international cooperation among independent sovereigns joined in a common cause and acting together or in parallel as sovereign partners.[xviii]
In the immediate year after the hallmark Convention, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism was launched. In the US-Russian joint-forces announcement of the Initiative, the states stated their “intention to pursue the necessary steps with all those who share (their)views to prevent the acquisition, transport, or use by terrorists of nuclear materials and radioactive substances or improvised explosive devices using such materials, as well as hostile actions against nuclear facilities.”[xix]
The objectives of this Initiative are reflected in the International Convention for the Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism, Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities as amended in 2005, the Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, and other international legal frameworks relevant to combating nuclear terrorism.
The two initiating states likewise called upon like-minded nations “to expand and accelerate efforts that develop partnership capacity to combat nuclear terrorism on a determined and systematic basis.” Together with other participating countries and interacting closely with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the States were determined to take the pertinent steps and approaches to assist participating states in improving their capabilities to: ensure accounting, control, and physical protection of nuclear material and radioactive substances, as well as security of nuclear facilities; detect and suppress illicit trafficking or other illicit activities involving such materials, especially measures to prevent their acquisition and use by terrorists; respond to and mitigate the consequences of acts of nuclear terrorism; ensure cooperation in the development of technical means to combat nuclear terrorism; ensure that law enforcement takes all possible measures to deny safe haven to terrorists seeking to acquire or use nuclear materials; and strengthen our respective national legal frameworks to ensure the effective prosecution of, and the certainty of punishment for, terrorists and those who facilitate such acts.[xx]
The launch of determined plans of action in the Initiative is a critical step toward developing a more interdependent and global network of partners to further prevent terrorists from acquiring and using nuclear weapons.
Considering all these efforts in securitizing the nuclear threat by terrorists, can we say that the threat has indeed been securitized?
The Copenhagen school of thought would affirm so. Waever argues that securitization is a speech act. It also has a certain rhetorical structure. In a securitization discourse, the issue at hand is presented as an utmost priority. Accordingly, by marking the issue with “security,” the actor is claiming that the issue requires and justifies the use of special procedures.
Securitization, through the speech act, does not happen simply because someone utters something about the issue in light of security. Although it can be reasonably considered as a very vital initial step for securitizing an issue because of the threat it poses, the utterance does not necessarily securitize an issue at hand, at once. The actor should likely be in a position of authority to the audience. By emphatically asserting and suggesting emergency actions to repel the threat, the securitization is being pushed through. But again, it does not complete the process right away. Extraordinary actions should follow.
Given the “utterance,” assertion, and a significant architecture of measures as essential factors in securitizing an issue, the International Convention on the Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism and other important resolutions and measures undertaken, therefore, make the issue of terrorism securitized.
Post-securitization
The efforts done for the securitization of nuclear terrorism cannot be fully considered great success if the measures planned and framed in the various conventions and initiatives will not be implemented appropriately. The continuous support by the affirming partners is very essential to sustain the initial steps that have been done.
The priority for all states must be accurately to account for and safeguard nuclear weapons and weapons-grade nuclear material from the irresponsible hands of terrorists. The international community should consider a key action in the hierarchy of priorities and that is to protect nuclear facilities, ensure that the acquisition of low-grade materials are blocked to deter the next steps of building and using of nuclear weapons by terrorists. Following that very primary step is assisting partners such as other states and advocates of anti-nuclear terrorism in developing programs and actions that encourage the responsible use of nuclear technology for scientific advancement instead of using it for damaging purposes.
These would really require vast undertakings, both financially and logistically. However, by doing so, the reaps are worth the efforts.
Limiting the growth of newly minted weapons and material from reaching the market is also an important step. In this way, the goals of the Nuclear Terrorism Convention and the decades-old NPT will not be left unachieved.
Conclusion
Perhaps, a considerably significant event in the past 60 years is the one that did not happen: the use of a nuclear weapon in conflict. The next question is “can it still be prevented?” This feat of preventing the construction and deployment of nuclear weapons by a large number of nations may be considered an accomplishment. And although there are yet big threats of its use by Pakistan, Iran and North Korea, the fact that nuclear weapons have not been used is rather admirable. But the international community cannot loosen up in spite of the many accomplishments and continuous support from the international community, for the threat is still here.
The nuclear threat might stay for long. The use of nuclear technology in any major international dispute is inevitable. It has to be expected actually. In time, new players and powers will emerge. The possibilities of worst scenarios in world war and a more troubled earth should be expected.
Even if the nightmare of Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombs is almost fading, if not long-gone, it still poses back the perils of the nuclear threat. The terrorist nuclear threat still exists. In spite of securitization efforts, the threat is still seen just like a bomb that when left unsecured, will just explode and make severe damages.
Securitizing the threat of nuclear terrorism will always be dared by the enemies of peace and security. Those people who continue to create tension will find their consequence in time. I have no right to condemn the terrorists. Nonetheless, I wholly condemn their way of expressing their want for change and hunger for attention. Those who tirelessly find solutions to solve the problem and encourage peaceful means of expression are commendable. Referring the government as the sole protagonist in this story of terrorism is contentious. The people behind “dirty weapons” are also victims – corrupted by the curse that trapped mankind into the quagmire of other threats it still struggles to battle with.
[i] Kydd, Andrew H., and Barbara F. Walter. "The Strategies of Terrorism." International Security 31, no. 1 (Summer 2006): 49-80.
[ii] Brabazon, Honor. “Protecting Whose Security?: Anti-Terrorism Legislation and the Criminalization of Dissent.” YCISS Working Paper Number 43, December 2006
[iii] O’Neill, Kevin. “The Nuclear Terrorist Threat.” Institute for Science and International Security, 1997
[iv] Cameron, Gavin. “Nuclear Terrorism: Weapons for Sale or Theft?” 2005
[v] Handwerk, Brian. “Nuclear Terrorism—How Great is the Threat?” 2002
[vi] Albright, David. "India's and Pakistan's Fissile Material and Nuclear Weapons Inventories, End of 1999"
[vii] Ibid
[viii] See, for example, Peter Baker, "Pakistani Scientist Who Met Bin Laden Failed Polygraphs, Renewing Suspicions," Washington Post, March 3, 2002.
[ix] Albright, David, Kevin O'Neill and Corey Hinderstein. “Nuclear Terrorism: The Unthinkable Nightmare.” ISIS, 2001
[x] Ibid
[xi] Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 3 Mar. 1980, 1987 UNTS 125, entered into force 8 Feb. 1987.
[xii] UN General Assembly Resolution 51/210, 17 Dec. 1996, p. 5.
[xiii] International Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, UN General Assembly Resolution 52/164, 15 Dec. 1997, entered into force 23 May 2001.
[xiv] International Convention on the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism, UN General Assembly Resolution 54/109, 9 Dec. 1999, entered into force 10 Apr. 2002.
[xv] The Ad Hoc Committee is also charged with developing a comprehensive treaty on terrorism.
[xvi] Convention, supra note 1, preamble.
[xvii] Welsh, Steven. “Nuclear Terrorism Convention: International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.” 2005.
[xviii] Ibid
[xix] Announcing the Global Initiative To Combat Nuclear Terrorism, US Department of State, 2006
[xx] Ibid
Aaron Grajo Laylo
In November 2001, as U.S. warplanes flew over Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden told a nerve-racking statement to Pakistani journalist Hamid Mira, “Al Qaeda had access to nuclear weapons and would not hesitate to use them for "self-defense."
Days are already dangerous and getting even more dangerous as dissenters make use of the latest and highly-developed machineries, tools and equipment in technology to frighten people and pressure governments to the extent of spurring discord within the latter. Eventually, referent objects, being the constant target of terrorist attacks and after being choked by threats, may get destabilized in the absence of pertinent security measures.
For years, strategic placement of cities and borders along coasts or natural barriers, the use of wall defenses, mighty armadas and trenches and tight ethno-religious groupings have been used as security strategies by nations to safeguard their territories from the foes’ invasion and other threats that may destabilize their society or even wipe out their civilization. The advent of the 20th century has seen airplanes, submarines, ballistic missiles, and weapons of mass destruction as new-fangled approaches to security. Since then, continuous innovations and revolutions have been made to satisfy standards of security. With this contemporary equipments and supplies, borders have become increasingly leaky thus the possibilities of breaking into the referent object’s realm. Consequently, destruction may just be seconds away to the very doorstep of territories on a scale previously not envisioned.
So to speak, we are living in a so called “borderless world.” This implies the continuing trend of globalization. This is the forcing factor that changes the international security landscape in a very drastic manner that it has compelled a fundamental reevaluation of security strategies. The global community has become interdependent, with the constant movement of people, ideas and goods. Migration, information, technology, ideas, goods and almost everything transferable are done conveniently. Given this fact, that we are in a borderless world, the threats that we face also have no borders and they continue to increase and break into every part of the globe. Endeavors are much more difficult to combat now and just as they are complex, the approaches should also be complex.
Perhaps, the toughest endeavor and threat that the international community is facing right now is terrorism. The recent significant terrorist attacks have put the issue of terrorism in a salient position where it is right now. Moreover, the threat of the use of nuclear terrorism likewise tends to make it even more worth the attention or limelight status on international peace and security.
The Seminar Paper
This paper will focus on Nuclear Terrorism’s threat to security particularly the menacing of terrorists to the international community on the acquisition, formulation, and use of nuclear weapons and devices as well as attacking or sabotaging their targets using stolen materials for the sinister purpose of mass destruction.
The primary concern of the paper is the securitization of nuclear terrorism and in doing this, I considered to divide it into three very important questions to dissect the larger remainder of the paper: first, why securitize it; second, how was it securitized; and third, what else can be done after such securitization to sustain the already laid down measures. But a short assessment of the security-terrorism nexus is definitely significant. It is considered in this paper.
Credible studies and analysis by scholars on global security and nuclear proliferation as well as organizations and groups inclined to the study of nuclear risks and counter-measures have been used lucratively as these are certainly important and helpful as a jumping ground for the seminar paper.
Accordingly, the questions of who are the securitizing actors, what is the referent object, what is the existential threat (because of which an issue has to be securitized; it is also the direct answer to why an issue is securitized) and how can it be securitize (what measures are not just available but more importantly, the most appropriate) will all be integrated into the three major questions supporting the primary concern of the paper: the securitization of the threat of nuclear terrorism.
Before fully gliding onto the nuclear terrorism threat proper of this paper, it is essential to primarily consider the arguments and other dimensions linking terrorism and security.
Terrorism and Security
Terrorism, in its real sense, has been existing since time immemorial but it was just in the most recent centuries when terrorism had become international community’s foremost opponent and its escalating threat has, for years, sort of “pressurized” the international audience and compel the authorities (practically, independent states) to ally their capacities to crash the terrors of today.
The strategy for terrorism has already been so apparent given countless incidents in almost all parts of the globe: it is the desperate attempt of a certain group to pressure its addressee (authority or government, including the population) and convince them to agree to their demands as to avoid future or further harms to the latter. Eventually, that existing government would get destabilized, a disgruntled population would the join an uprising by the threatening group thus the escalation of the conflict. Basing on historical events in the past, the common grounds of disputes are the following: secession of a territory to form a new sovereign state; dominance of territory or resources by various ethnic groups; imposition of a particular form of government, such as democracy, theocracy, or anarchy; economic deprivation of a population; and opposition to a domestic government or occupying army. Thirst for attention, pursuit for change, and expression of grievances are therefore the primary factors of their rebellious undertakings.
Kydd and Walter, in their article Strategies of Terrorism posited that terrorism is designed to change minds by destroying bodies. This may be interpreted as influencing people to sympathize with them in their goals but in making it possible, so many lives were negatively affected by their actions (destroying bodies) and worse, long term psychological effects or traumas to the victims. In their perspective of terrorism, they also considered that it is a form of costly signaling and employs five primary strategies of this: attrition, intimidation, provocation, spoiling, and outbidding. In an attrition strategy, terrorists seek to persuade the enemy that the terrorists are strong enough to impose considerable costs if the enemy continues a particular policy. Terrorists using intimidation try to convince the population that the terrorists are strong enough to punish disobedience and that the government is too weak to stop them, so that people behave as the terrorists wish. A provocation strategy is an attempt to induce the enemy to respond to terrorism with indiscriminate violence, which radicalizes the population and moves them to support the terrorists. Spoilers attack in an effort to persuade the enemy that moderates on the terrorists’ side are weak and untrustworthy, thus undermining attempts to reach a peace settlement. Groups engaged in outbidding use violence to convince the public that the terrorists have greater resolve to fight the enemy than rival groups, and therefore are worthy of support. Understanding these five distinct strategic logics is crucial not only for understanding terrorism but also for designing effective antiterrorism policies.[i]
Accordingly, the strategies being undertaken by the terrorists wish to signal that the latter have the capacity to impose costs on those who oppose them (their target, practically, the government and the population). However, the authors are also keen to the fact that each strategy works well under certain conditions only and poorly under others. Also, state responses to one strategy may be inappropriate for others.
Various measures have already been done to crash down terrorism but most governments are not that keen, sensitive or cautious if the suspicion followed by initial actions is reasonable. What must be behind the targeted group’s “terrorist” action? One dilemma that will emerge here is this: which side is really on the right position to say that their actions are reasonable, the State and the civilians which would argue that their security is the one that is more threatened by violent actions that would not only destabilize it (in the case of the State/ government) or injure them but worse, kill their loved ones (in the case of the civilians); OR is it the group who, because of fury and aggression, went to pressure the former so that it could have proportional rights or at least proper treatment from the State? They would also argue that they are more insecure because of the denial of their rights to decent living and other services that are supposedly to be provided by the government. It is actually not just concrete supplies and services that they are asking for but also proportional rights in terms of status as a minority or that feeling of being prejudiced.
Perhaps, one can attest to a more just image of the government and a negative image of the terrorists. On the other hand, one could strongly argue that it is the discriminated and/or unsatisfied people-turned-terrorists that should be considered more prone to other threats like incessant violence, disease and hunger in their far-flung and almost rejected places. This has become a dilemma to many contemporary scholars. It is very likely that “nagatungan” biases would further escalate debates on this issue.
To put it in a simpler way, the question here is “whose security should really be considered?”
This above-mentioned query was also asked by Brabazon but the approach was in light of the impacts of anti-terrorism legislations on civil liberties. After the 911 attack, most of the policies that were made aimed to further strengthen the capacity of the State to protect definite interests. Since then, a growing body of literature has developed examining the impact of anti-terrorism legislation on civil liberties, but very little addresses the impact of the legislation specifically on social movements or on dissent to the current configuration of power in their society more generally.[ii] Furthermore, his paper gives the reader preliminary analysis of the impact and potential impact of anti-terrorism legislation on social movements focusing on the possible political rationale behind such impacts. As Brabazon strongly asserted, the policies are designed directly or indirectly to protect the dominant economic project by criminalizing the social movements and community organizing that threatens it – in short, to criminalize dissent.
The wide array of literature (arguments, hypotheses, debates and dilemmas) about terrorism is indeed multi-dimensional. The questions raised are just portions of the evolving views, broadening dimensions and rising contentions on the terrorism-security knot. In the next portions of the paper, nonetheless, these questions may still and also be relevant. The focus of the paper would be the much more obvious but similarly important dimension of the many threats and security issues in relation to terrorism.
From “Mere” Terrorism to Nuclear Terrorism
When asked to picture a terrorist scenario, one would already think of suicide bombings in urban centers and major cities of the globe, exploding buses and trains, anthrax scare and other dissemination of toxic materials, harsh hostage scenarios and violent confrontations by the military and the terrorist groups.
In September 2001, there was the World Trade Center attack. On the same day, the “invincible” Pentagon was also attacked. Just few weeks after these incidents, was the sudden anthrax scare. Since then, the American nightmare has become much more imaginable not only to the Americans themselves but to the global community too. That was the beginning of the so-called (Global) War on Terrorism.
Prior to that, there had already been other relatively “minor” terrorist attacks in the Asia-Pacific region particularly in the Philippines by the Abu Sayyaf; ETA and IRA attacks in Europe particularly in Madrid and London, HAMAS attacks in the Middle East and so on. Subsequent to the famous 911 event, the attacks were already perceived as the terrorist network’s series of terror activities. The 911 became a benchmark event and the Al Qaeda terrorist group eventually became an internationally recognized but despised terrorist organization led by Bin Laden. In the course of that very recent and still vivid portion of modern history, the issue on religion-rooted and state-sponsored terrorism also escalated as well as an exaggerated discrimination to Arab-looking people and all those that have Arab-sounding names.
The intimidating menaces of the terrorist network are indeed seriously threatening to and crucial in international peace and security. What more if they go nuclear?
The war now is not actually between or among states. It is indeed a war on terrorism and the threat is worse: WHEN TERRORISTS GO NUCLEAR (Can terrorists really use nuclear weapons as their “newest” menacing thing? How big is the threat?)
The threat of nuclear terrorism is big.
It is very threatening. (emphasis)
The proliferation of nuclear weapons or radiological dispersal devices to terrorist groups can be considered as the gravest of all terrorist threats facing the international community especially the US which is at the forefront of major attacks. The possibility of terrorists constructing or obtaining a nuclear weapon and detonating it in a city is already recognized by many scholars, scientists, and policy-makers alike.
Nuclear materials, technologies and know-how are more widely available today than ever before. Small quantities of both fissile materials and highly radioactive materials, sufficient to manufacture a radiological dispersal device, are actively traded on the black market. Although terrorist groups are not suspected of actually acquiring such materials in large quantities, it is difficult to know for sure. A nuclear detonation by a terrorist group would likely result in an unprecedented number of casualties. In contrast, a radiological dispersal attack would probably be less violent, but could significantly contaminate an urban center, causing economic and social disruption. Also, both types of attacks would have significant psychological impacts on the entire population.[iii]
Why Securitize Nuclear Terrorism?
The outright answer for this is simply because it is a very obvious existential threat to the State. Terrorism itself is already a threat. What more if the way of executing such violence would be by the use of nuclear weapons, or the initial threat of the possibilities that these hazardous materials are in the hands of the terrorists and at any point of conflict, the dirty bomb would just exploded.
There are three major potential nuclear security threats: the acquisition of nuclear weapons by theft; the creation of nuclear explosive devices using stolen nuclear materials; and the use of these weapons. All these are possible actions that can be undertaken by terrorists posing a greater threat to security. Unlike during the Cold War when US and USSR (as the leading nuclear states) together with the others (France, Britain and China) are the only possible source of tension and fear for the international community, the threat is greater in that there are big possibilities of acquiring, building and using (and use for attack) these radioactive materials and nuclear weapons irresponsibly in the hands of terrorists. Adding to the already big threat are also the possibilities that Iran and North Korea Korea’s state sponsorship would also create greater tension not only to the most vulnerable of attacks but also to the international community.
Acquisition
Terrorists can acquire nuclear weapons by theft, procurement or manufacturing. Manufacturing cannot be done of there are no materials to use. Therefore, the primary concern is: where can they get these materials?
Roughly 30,000 nuclear weapons exist worldwide. Several hundred weapons are vulnerable to theft by terrorists or criminals who might sell them to terrorist organizations. It is clear that some such groups are interested in acquiring a nuclear device:
It seems improbable that a state would deliberately provide a nuclear weapon to a terrorist group unless it is a state-sponsored case. Fear of retribution from the attacked state and international community, potential loss of control over the nuclear-armed terrorist group, and a reluctance to surrender nuclear weapons to another party due to the intrinsic difficulty of acquiring them all mitigate against such state sponsorship.[iv]
Still, the United States and Russia maintain the world's largest nuclear stockpiles. While many nuclear weapons in Russia are adequately protected from theft, others are not. Many Soviet-era tactical nuclear devices are especially vulnerable, and given the smaller size of such weapons, would be particularly suitable for use by terrorists. The demise of the U.S.S.R. left the security of such materials in doubt, but as yet there is no evidence that any has fallen into the wrong hands.
Regarding the possibility of the Al Qaeda terrorists in acquiring materials, Dr. Gary Samore of the International Institute for Strategic Studies said "In the decade since the collapse of the Soviet Union, there is no documented case that we know of where a substantial quantity of weapons-grade material was offered for sale on the black market. As far as we know, no one has been able to acquire a substantial quantity of the material—much less create a weapon itself. Of course, one has to allow for the possibility that it's happened and we don't know about it, but so far it seems to be a horrible scenario that hasn't yet taken place."[v]
Another state that is seen as a possible source and manufacturing state is Pakistan. It is thought to have some 30-50 nuclear weapons, based on a stockpile of some 600-800 kilograms of HEU.[vi] Pakistan is now also producing weapons plutonium, but the amount produced to date is believed to be small, only enough for a handful of additional nuclear weapons.[vii]
A significant segment of Pakistani society holds extreme Islamic views and is sympathetic to the Taliban and al Qaeda. This includes some insiders within Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, as demonstrated by the case of Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, a former head of Pakistan's plutonium production who strongly supported the Taliban, met with Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan, and was placed under house arrest for a time on suspicion of passing nuclear secrets to bin Laden.[viii] The possibility that insiders would attempt to steal a nuclear weapon or nuclear material to make one, or to pass secrets on nuclear weapons design and assembly, is real. Hence, effective measures to address insider threats must be put in place at Pakistani nuclear weapons and nuclear material facilities.
Of where they can really acquire materials to use is still a puzzle. However, even if they can acquire, the next step is still difficult.
Building Weapons
The first question of building nuclear weapons by terrorists has already been addressed by many governments and by nongovernmental groups. Nuclear materials, technologies and know-how are more widely available today than ever before. Small quantities of fissile materials are actively traded on the black market. Although terrorist groups are not known to currently possess fissile materials in sufficient quantities to make nuclear explosives, they are known to have made attempts to acquire fissile materials.[ix]
The ability of a terrorist group to weaponize the fissile material into a nuclear weapon is difficult to assess. Even without direct state support, a well-funded, technically competent terrorist group could assemble the necessary skills and facilities to weaponize fissile material. Terrorist groups that are safely established within states would have a far easier time in researching and developing nuclear weapons, whether or not the state provided direct assistance to their nuclear efforts. Without the opportunity to work uninterrupted for a significant period of time, a terrorist group may find the task beyond its reach. If the terrorist group succeeded in obtaining fissile material, it would then be in the position to rapidly make a nuclear weapon.[x]
Use of Nuclear Weapons
The question about whether terrorists would use nuclear weapons is much more difficult to assess. Opinions on terrorism, however, are changing. In the past, analysts have regarded nuclear terrorism as unlikely, given the likely international backlash against such an attack. But now, a new breed of terrorists, motivated by religious rather than political goals, seem less concerned with the consequences of creating large numbers of casualties. Such groups might use nuclear weapons if given the chance.
Into Securitization
Given these concrete threats, we can already say that terrorism should definitely be securitized. But looking further, using the Copenhagen notion of securitization, what propelled the further securitization of terrorism from already a considered above politics issue? The notion simply puts it this way: securitization is the “move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics.”
I would like to put an emphasis on the fact that terrorism has already been considered an above politics issue even before the tragic 911 attacks. Since the dawn of the twentieth century, terrorism had already become a salient issue especially in conflict-ridden countries. The only distinct factor is that after 911, all the states’ independent treatment (national level security measures) of the issue as one that is above politics issue were all consolidated and integrated into the very fabric of a global war on terrorism (international level). Meaning, what really drove the states’ engine of politicization to a more intense level was the need for an allied, or perhaps a better term is interdependent, actions that would pursue policies and establish appropriate measures that could meet the real urgency of securitizing the issue of terrorism.
Interestingly, because of that rapid soar of the securitization of terrorism, it was not considered to be treated at all in a regional level. It was accelerated to an international level at once. This is because of the clear fact that although terrorism primarily thrives in independent conflict-ridden states, the effect of globalization has become an essential tool that even terrorists have had a network. This also brings us to the reality that terrorism cannot really be solved without international cooperation because after all, terrorism has become an international problem. (emphasis)
So why is there a need to put nuclear terrorism in an above-politics level? Any form of terrorism is simply terrorism itself. No matter what form it is, it is still that violent activity that should be toppled down immediately. Actually, the Global War on Terrorism by the US does not specifically pinpoint which form of terrorism should be knocked down first. That’s the very reason why it was called an all-out war on terrorism, meaning, there is a certain goal of completely obliterating terrorism from the face of the earth (not being pessimistic, but realistically speaking, that’s like reaching the moon in a day). Therefore, it doesn’t really matter if the threat is nuclear, chemical, biological, traditional weapons or other forms when realizing securitization of terrorism. At the end of the day, we still call all these forms of violence as terrorist activities.
There are immediate oppositions to this argument. One can say that there should always be a hierarchy of priorities insofar threat is concerned. Narrowing down to terrorism, an argument that may arise is that there are really weapons that are more dangerous and threatening compared with other weapons or forms of terrorism. Exploding a bus or mini-store is different from exploding a whole city. The case of Madrid bombings is different from the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings. Different levels and approaches should then be supplied. This line is argument is much more favorable and would put nuclear terrorism at the foremost concern in securitizing terrorism and other actions.
How was it securitized?
Considering first the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation, the most significant action providing this is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) of . It remains the global anchor for disarmament too. Although there are flaws in the system, its implementation continues to provide security benefits by proving assurance that nuclear energy is not misused for weapon purposes. Weapons can be advanced by nuclear technologies but responsible management of it is an imperative step. Although this said treaty is sometimes perceived as project of the industrialized states, it benefits as well other “weaker” states.
Although various efforts had already been done prior to and following the 911 to combat terrorism, it was just in 2005 that the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism was adopted by the United Nations.
The idea for a treaty on the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism originated in the 1990s in the wake of growing concerns about the threat of terrorists using nuclear or radiological material. Worries about terrorists gaining access to nuclear materials date back to earlier periods, as illustrated by the adoption in 1980 of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.[xi] The post-Cold War surge of fears about terrorism generally and, more specifically, terrorism involving biological, chemical, nuclear, or radiological agents led to the establishment by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in December 1996 of an Ad Hoc Committee mandated “to elaborate an international convention for the suppression of terrorist bombings and, subsequently, an international convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism, to supplement related existing international instruments, and thereafter to address means of further developing a comprehensive legal framework of conventions dealing with international terrorism[.]”[xii]
Since its establishment, the Ad Hoc Committee has produced three treaties that the UN General Assembly adopted and that have entered into force: the International Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (adopted in 1997; entered into force in 2001);[xiii] the International Convention on the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism (adopted in 1999; entered into force in 2002);[xiv] and the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (Convention) (adopted in 2005; entered into force in 2007).[xv] The Convention represents, therefore, the first anti-terrorism treaty adopted after September 11, 2001. Despite the relevance of many international legal instruments to nuclear terrorism, the UN General Assembly and the Ad Hoc Committee created the Convention because “existing multilateral legal provisions do not adequately address those attacks[.]”[xvi]
The Convention aims to address the unlawful possession or use of nuclear devices or materials by non-state actors. It calls for states to develop appropriate legal frameworks criminalizing nuclear terrorism-related offenses, investigate alleged offenses, and, as appropriate, arrest, prosecute, or extradite offenders. It also calls for international cooperation with nuclear terrorism investigations and prosecutions, through information-sharing, extradition and the transfer of detainees to assist with foreign investigations and prosecutions.[xvii]
The Nuclear Terrorism Convention speaks to values and themes articulated to varying degrees in the past by the United States and its allies. The following are the most important themes insofar combating terrorism by international cooperation is concerned:
a. outlawing and condemning terrorist activities
b. demonstrating global unity in opposition to terrorism
c. treating terrorism as a matter subject to domestic and international law
d. challenging states to use, and if necessary adapt, their domestic legal systems to combat terrorism
e. looking to states to cooperate as sovereign partners in the fight against terrorism, doing so within the context of domestic legal actions, as well as through related international mechanisms such as sovereign-to-sovereign extradition (but, as mentioned above, not by utilizing a free-standing international bureaucracy like the ICC, differences over which have contributed to Transatlantic friction)
f. using the United Nations as an international forum to develop inter-state cooperation, as a gathering place for sovereign partners
g. using international law as a basis and framework for action, and using the United Nations as a forum for developing international law
As can be seen, these themes touch on values held, for example, by both Europe and the United States. It gives security a high priority; grounds security in law, including international law; is UN-centered; and is sovereignty-based, calling for international cooperation among independent sovereigns joined in a common cause and acting together or in parallel as sovereign partners.[xviii]
In the immediate year after the hallmark Convention, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism was launched. In the US-Russian joint-forces announcement of the Initiative, the states stated their “intention to pursue the necessary steps with all those who share (their)views to prevent the acquisition, transport, or use by terrorists of nuclear materials and radioactive substances or improvised explosive devices using such materials, as well as hostile actions against nuclear facilities.”[xix]
The objectives of this Initiative are reflected in the International Convention for the Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism, Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities as amended in 2005, the Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, and other international legal frameworks relevant to combating nuclear terrorism.
The two initiating states likewise called upon like-minded nations “to expand and accelerate efforts that develop partnership capacity to combat nuclear terrorism on a determined and systematic basis.” Together with other participating countries and interacting closely with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the States were determined to take the pertinent steps and approaches to assist participating states in improving their capabilities to: ensure accounting, control, and physical protection of nuclear material and radioactive substances, as well as security of nuclear facilities; detect and suppress illicit trafficking or other illicit activities involving such materials, especially measures to prevent their acquisition and use by terrorists; respond to and mitigate the consequences of acts of nuclear terrorism; ensure cooperation in the development of technical means to combat nuclear terrorism; ensure that law enforcement takes all possible measures to deny safe haven to terrorists seeking to acquire or use nuclear materials; and strengthen our respective national legal frameworks to ensure the effective prosecution of, and the certainty of punishment for, terrorists and those who facilitate such acts.[xx]
The launch of determined plans of action in the Initiative is a critical step toward developing a more interdependent and global network of partners to further prevent terrorists from acquiring and using nuclear weapons.
Considering all these efforts in securitizing the nuclear threat by terrorists, can we say that the threat has indeed been securitized?
The Copenhagen school of thought would affirm so. Waever argues that securitization is a speech act. It also has a certain rhetorical structure. In a securitization discourse, the issue at hand is presented as an utmost priority. Accordingly, by marking the issue with “security,” the actor is claiming that the issue requires and justifies the use of special procedures.
Securitization, through the speech act, does not happen simply because someone utters something about the issue in light of security. Although it can be reasonably considered as a very vital initial step for securitizing an issue because of the threat it poses, the utterance does not necessarily securitize an issue at hand, at once. The actor should likely be in a position of authority to the audience. By emphatically asserting and suggesting emergency actions to repel the threat, the securitization is being pushed through. But again, it does not complete the process right away. Extraordinary actions should follow.
Given the “utterance,” assertion, and a significant architecture of measures as essential factors in securitizing an issue, the International Convention on the Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism and other important resolutions and measures undertaken, therefore, make the issue of terrorism securitized.
Post-securitization
The efforts done for the securitization of nuclear terrorism cannot be fully considered great success if the measures planned and framed in the various conventions and initiatives will not be implemented appropriately. The continuous support by the affirming partners is very essential to sustain the initial steps that have been done.
The priority for all states must be accurately to account for and safeguard nuclear weapons and weapons-grade nuclear material from the irresponsible hands of terrorists. The international community should consider a key action in the hierarchy of priorities and that is to protect nuclear facilities, ensure that the acquisition of low-grade materials are blocked to deter the next steps of building and using of nuclear weapons by terrorists. Following that very primary step is assisting partners such as other states and advocates of anti-nuclear terrorism in developing programs and actions that encourage the responsible use of nuclear technology for scientific advancement instead of using it for damaging purposes.
These would really require vast undertakings, both financially and logistically. However, by doing so, the reaps are worth the efforts.
Limiting the growth of newly minted weapons and material from reaching the market is also an important step. In this way, the goals of the Nuclear Terrorism Convention and the decades-old NPT will not be left unachieved.
Conclusion
Perhaps, a considerably significant event in the past 60 years is the one that did not happen: the use of a nuclear weapon in conflict. The next question is “can it still be prevented?” This feat of preventing the construction and deployment of nuclear weapons by a large number of nations may be considered an accomplishment. And although there are yet big threats of its use by Pakistan, Iran and North Korea, the fact that nuclear weapons have not been used is rather admirable. But the international community cannot loosen up in spite of the many accomplishments and continuous support from the international community, for the threat is still here.
The nuclear threat might stay for long. The use of nuclear technology in any major international dispute is inevitable. It has to be expected actually. In time, new players and powers will emerge. The possibilities of worst scenarios in world war and a more troubled earth should be expected.
Even if the nightmare of Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombs is almost fading, if not long-gone, it still poses back the perils of the nuclear threat. The terrorist nuclear threat still exists. In spite of securitization efforts, the threat is still seen just like a bomb that when left unsecured, will just explode and make severe damages.
Securitizing the threat of nuclear terrorism will always be dared by the enemies of peace and security. Those people who continue to create tension will find their consequence in time. I have no right to condemn the terrorists. Nonetheless, I wholly condemn their way of expressing their want for change and hunger for attention. Those who tirelessly find solutions to solve the problem and encourage peaceful means of expression are commendable. Referring the government as the sole protagonist in this story of terrorism is contentious. The people behind “dirty weapons” are also victims – corrupted by the curse that trapped mankind into the quagmire of other threats it still struggles to battle with.
[i] Kydd, Andrew H., and Barbara F. Walter. "The Strategies of Terrorism." International Security 31, no. 1 (Summer 2006): 49-80.
[ii] Brabazon, Honor. “Protecting Whose Security?: Anti-Terrorism Legislation and the Criminalization of Dissent.” YCISS Working Paper Number 43, December 2006
[iii] O’Neill, Kevin. “The Nuclear Terrorist Threat.” Institute for Science and International Security, 1997
[iv] Cameron, Gavin. “Nuclear Terrorism: Weapons for Sale or Theft?” 2005
[v] Handwerk, Brian. “Nuclear Terrorism—How Great is the Threat?” 2002
[vi] Albright, David. "India's and Pakistan's Fissile Material and Nuclear Weapons Inventories, End of 1999"
[vii] Ibid
[viii] See, for example, Peter Baker, "Pakistani Scientist Who Met Bin Laden Failed Polygraphs, Renewing Suspicions," Washington Post, March 3, 2002.
[ix] Albright, David, Kevin O'Neill and Corey Hinderstein. “Nuclear Terrorism: The Unthinkable Nightmare.” ISIS, 2001
[x] Ibid
[xi] Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 3 Mar. 1980, 1987 UNTS 125, entered into force 8 Feb. 1987.
[xii] UN General Assembly Resolution 51/210, 17 Dec. 1996, p. 5.
[xiii] International Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, UN General Assembly Resolution 52/164, 15 Dec. 1997, entered into force 23 May 2001.
[xiv] International Convention on the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism, UN General Assembly Resolution 54/109, 9 Dec. 1999, entered into force 10 Apr. 2002.
[xv] The Ad Hoc Committee is also charged with developing a comprehensive treaty on terrorism.
[xvi] Convention, supra note 1, preamble.
[xvii] Welsh, Steven. “Nuclear Terrorism Convention: International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.” 2005.
[xviii] Ibid
[xix] Announcing the Global Initiative To Combat Nuclear Terrorism, US Department of State, 2006
[xx] Ibid
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